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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Evidence-based models for criminal justice reforms are in 
vogue. Empirically informed and objectively driven, evidence-based 
practices offer a welcome displacement of more ideologically oriented 
policies conditioned upon raw human presumptions about culpability, 
morality, and future dangerousness.1 A prominent fixture in the 
evidence-based practices movement features contemporary risk 
assessment tools. These tools draw upon statistical methodologies and 
practices that purportedly permit officials to differentiate offenders at a 
higher risk of future dangerousness from those at a lower risk. Today, 
risk assessments inform a host of criminal justice outcomes across 
jurisdictions, such as the length of sentences, bail or parole eligibility, 
supervised release conditions, probation/parole revocation, institutional 
security level, and program assignment.2 Forensic scientists encourage 
policymakers to recognize and to prefer robust evidence concerning 
recidivism risk in order to better allocate criminal justice resources and 
meet the criminogenic needs of offenders. Still, as a prominent 
criminologist warns, “the important feature in evaluating the ‘evidence’ 
is its quality—its errors, flaws in its application, and violations of the 
assumptions in the model being applied.”3 
Most critical attention towards the elements incorporated into 
risk assessment tools has focused on the potential unconstitutionality, 
 
 
1
  Alfred Blumstein, Some Perspectives on Quantitative Criminology Pre-JQC: And 
then some, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 549, 554 (2010). 
 
2
  Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 167, 167 (2014); Paisly Bender, Exposing the Hidden Penalties of 
Pleading Guilty: A Revision of the Collateral Consequences Rule, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 291, 313 (2011). 
 
3
  Blumstein, supra note 1, at 554. 
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statutory illegality, or ethically challenged use of factors that directly or 
indirectly measure sociodemographic or other immutable characteristics 
of individuals.4 Nonetheless, a personal history of criminal conduct is 
the most common type of factor across risk assessment tools. Reliance 
upon criminal history in recidivism prediction has remained largely free 
of scrutiny in academic literature and court filings. This is because the 
tradition carries little political baggage and, unlike many of the 
sociodemographic variables that may represent extralegal factors in 
criminal justice determinations, criminal history is normally considered 
a legal factor—and thus viewed as an immanently appropriate 
consideration—in those same decisions.5 
Since prior offense history is consistently and significantly 
correlated with recidivism,6 the presence of such factors in risk 
adjudication appears reasonable. Realistically, the past has come to be 
viewed as a proxy to predicting the future. This article introduces and 
probes a host of issues with the now intersecting uses and consequences 
of criminal history and future risk ideologies in the criminal justice 
system. Thus, it entails an evaluation of the science of risk 
methodologies, its flaws in application, and the integrity of the models’ 
assumptions regarding reliance upon prior offense records. The goal is 
to raise awareness of the issues so outlined and to instigate a debate 
about potential responses to ameliorate likely negative effects. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section II provides a 
theoretical and historical account of past criminal record and future risk 
assessments, which have infiltrated and eventually shaped modern 
criminal justice policies and outcomes, both individually and 
collectively. The evidence-based practices movement has evolved into 
one that recycles criminal past as a substantive and procedural proxy for 
future risk prediction. Section III questions the multiplicative impact 
caused by risk assessments based on criminal history. The discussion 
shows that the same criminal history event may, through risk assessment 
 
 
4
  Compare generally Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014), and Kelly Hannah-
Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270 (2013), and 
J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329 (2011), with Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs 
Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (2015), 
and Tonry, supra note 2. 
 
5
  James F. Nelson, An Operational Definition of Prior Criminal Record, 5 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 333, 333 (1998). 
 
6
  Infra note 73. 
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tools, be counted over and over again. Criminal records often appear as 
well to represent an unofficial aggravator of punishment. This may be 
the case, for instance, if an increase in sanctions results from the 
combination of the present offense plus a criminal record. In addition, 
Section III raises questions about the sources of data upon which risk 
tools’ criminal history factors are mathematically scored in relation to 
the tendency of including alleged offenses, acquitted conduct, and 
juvenile deviancy. In these ways, the critique employs the theme of the 
movie trilogy Back to the Future, starring Michael J. Fox.7 Fox’s 
character, Marty McFly, is reminded that, when offered a machine that 
can deliver him to his past life, any changes made during his revisit may 
alter the future. Here, the theme is useful in its symbolism to indicate a 
potential reconstruction of an individual’s past that affects his future life. 
Section IV explores several normative issues with the past-
offense-to-future-prediction proxy relationship now existing in 
evidence-based systems. A sort of “unofficial recidivism aggravator” 
arguably presents past, present, and/or future consequences in that the 
result may represent punishment for the recidivist’s status as a criminal 
or as exhibiting poor character. The currently imposed penalty might 
thereby become disproportionately severe and appear to symbolize a 
sanction for a hypothetical future crime. Additional issues addressed in 
Section IV include the potential that criminal history is an unfortunate 
proxy for race and social disadvantage and the general failure of risk 
assessment instruments to adequately consider patterns of desistance 
whereby a prior crime generally loses its empirical significance, 
particularly as an offender ages. Conclusions follow in Section V. 
II.  THE ROLES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
Contemporary criminal justice practices have incorporated and 
multiplied the impact of criminal history, as well as future risk 
prediction, on various decisions and actions by officials. Each of these 
practices entails its own theories to justify its utility and experienced its 
own historical trajectory. Still, considerations of individual criminal 
history and future predictions now often overlap. Today, policies and 
judgments to constrain dangerousness heavily depend upon past criminal 
history measures to adjudge future risk of correctional failure and 
recidivism. This section will begin with a relatively brief overview of 
the incorporation of and theoretical underpinnings for criminal history 
 
 
7
  BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures 1985, 1989, 1990). 
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measures in various criminal law and procedure contexts. The more 
recent and refined conceptualization of risk and the implementation of 
specific risk assessment strategies are outlined. It is critical to delineate 
how modernist risk methods have assimilated and amplified criminal 
history scores as a central component of predicting future behavior, and 
to recognize the significance of this intersection to various criminal 
justice outcomes. Consistent with the Back to the Future theme, one’s 
(re)constructed past can dictate one’s future. 
A. Theories Underlying the Role of Criminal History 
Consideration of an individual’s criminal history has endured a 
long history in American justice. Officials often consider past offending 
as relevant to ascertaining culpability for a more current offense, 
determining a proportional punishment, and constructing correctional 
conditions considering potential future dangerousness. It is best 
conceptualized with the nomenclature of the “recidivist premium.” The 
term primarily applies in the context of sentencing, where an increase in 
punishment for an index offense may be justified merely because the 
specific defendant had been convicted of a prior crime.8 There is 
evidence that the idea of the recidivist premium in sentencing decisions 
is centuries old – accounts date back to the beginning of mankind 
through narratives in Biblical,9 Hebrew, Roman, and other ancient 
texts.10 In modern times, recidivist premiums in sentencing persist and 
are found in both formal policies and informal processes. Informally, 
decision makers with some discretionary capacity may consider past 
offending in an often casual manner in doling out sentences. Observers 
note that traditions for escalating penalties based on criminal history 
simply makes “common sense”11 and remain “intuitively appealing.”12 
 
 
8
  George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 54, 54 (1982). 
 
9
  Alexis M. Durham III, Justice in Sentencing: The Role of Prior Record of Criminal 
Involvement, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 614, 616 (1987) (citing source). 
 
10
  Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 
CRIME & JUST. 303, 308 (1997) (citing sources thereto). 
 
11
  David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 
110 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (2001); see also C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., Punishing Repeat 
Offenders More Severely, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127 (2000) (“That repeat 
offenders are punished more severely . . . is a generally accepted practice”); Moshe 
Burnovski & Zvi Safra, Deterrence Effects of Sequential Punishment Policies: Should 
Repeat Offenders Be More Severely Punished?, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 341, 341 
(1994) (“The concept of punishing repeat offenders more severely is strongly 
rooted. . . . It has been accepted as a major factor underlying the statutory punishment 
policy in the United States and other countries.”). 
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Examples of official rules popular in recent decades that formally 
incorporate recidivist premiums include the following: so-called three-
strikes laws which trigger mandatory minimums or supplemental 
increases in sentence length based on the existence of one or more 
previous convictions; guideline systems that recommend sentencing 
ranges at the intersection of severity of current offense and criminal 
history score; and career criminal or habitual offender sentence 
enhancements.13 
While “recidivist premiums” traditionally indicates aggravating 
sentencing factors, this article enlists the term to apply more broadly. It 
will definitively adopt its use in the sentencing context while also 
enlarging the concept to incorporate other criminal procedure contexts. 
Notably, offense record considerations in recent years have influenced 
decisions in such criminal law areas as the availability of bail, probation 
conditions, parole release, security level determinations, intensity of 
programming, and requirements for criminal registries. To the extent 
that these results also inherently involve potential infringements upon 
liberty and privacy and are experienced as punishing and labeling, the 
idea of a premium or an additional price to pay for past behavior feels 
apposite. 
At a high level of abstraction, the importance of a criminal 
record for various criminal justice decisions is its perceived utility as a 
useful proxy for adjudging both the individual’s greater culpability in 
committing a newer crime and his risk of future recidivism.14 The next 
subsections analyze recidivist premiums using more definitive theories 
underlying corrections policies. Indeed, the “widespread practical 
acceptance of recidivist premiums, notwithstanding the question of 
whether an offender’s criminal history ought to affect her penalty for a 
current offense, has been the subject of heated theoretical debate dating 
back to Plato.”15 
1. Retribution 
The theory of retribution in punishment philosophy is concerned 
 
 
12
  Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime — Not the Prior Convictions 
of the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded 
to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 345 (2014). 
 
13
  Durham, supra note 9, at 617–19. 
 
14
  Julian V. Roberts & Orhun H. Yalincak, Revisiting Prior Record Enhancement 
Provisions in State Sentencing Guidelines, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 177, 178 (2014). 
 
15
  Talia Fisher, Conviction without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833, 844 (2012). 
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principally with blame and desert.16 For classic retributivists, just 
punishment is measured by proportionality: the harshness of a 
punishment is dictated by the severity of the instant offense.17 The 
theory of retribution is backward-looking, with no interest in the 
prevention of future harm. Thus, the retributive philosophy is 
unconcerned with deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.18 
Retribution permits punishment for the harm caused; punishment 
“cannot be inflicted as a means of pursuing some other aim.”19 
Traditional retribution philosophy is also quite focused. Strict 
retributivists do not countenance any form of recidivist premium 
because they believe a punishment should only consider the current 
offense.20 
Nonetheless, some modern just-deserts philosophers envision 
some role that prior offending history can properly play in determining a 
proportional punishment, though these scholars provide slightly different 
accounts to justify their positions. Some retributivists who embrace the 
 
 
16
  Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 449, 449 (2012). 
 
17
  Husak, supra note 16, at 453. 
 
18
  Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 551 (2008). 
 
19
  Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime - Not the Prior Convictions of 
the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to 
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 368 (2014). For 
retribution, “the justification for punishment does not turn on the likely achievement of 
desirable outcomes; it is justified even when ‘we are practically certain that’ attempts to 
attain consequentialist goals such as deterrence and rehabilitation ‘will fail.’” Id. 
 
20
  Fisher, supra note 15, at 845. “[S]ome scholars take the position that prior 
convictions should play no role at sentencing, since they are unrelated to the seriousness 
of the crime or the offender’s culpability for the current offense.” Roberts & Yalincak, 
supra note 14, at 177 (citing MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING: A 
RATIONAL APPROACH (2001)).  
Repeat offender laws have long been challenged by retributivists on the 
grounds that they penalize an offender’s insufficient obsequiousness and that 
they have nothing to do with the offender’s present moral desert as they 
punish her not for the present act, but for another act already punished. A 
person who robs another of $ 20 at gun point is no more blameworthy simply 
because she had five years earlier been convicted of burglary. At most, that 
person can be said to have ignored the state’s admonition five years ago not to 
engage in certain criminal behavior. Considering that modern retributivism 
arose from a distrust of what was perceived as rehabilitationism’s affinity for 
hypocritical paternalism, it comes as a surprise that some desert theorists 
provide even modest support for what amounts to a penalty for recalcitrance. 
Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 
689, 705 (1995) (citations omitted). 
ISSUE 20:1 SPRING 2015 
82 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 20:1 
idea that criminal history deserves some relevance explain it not as a 
recidivist premium, but in terms of a discount for first-time offenders.21 
Several explanations exist for a first-offender allowance. One is a 
preference to infer that a defendant without a criminal past simply 
experienced an uncharacteristic and temporary lapse in judgment.22 With 
evidence of prior offending, though, the supposition of a normally law-
abiding character is eroded and the discount becomes undeserved.23 A 
critique of the lapse theory is that judgments about character would have 
the unfortunate consequence of theoretically opening the door to 
evidence of law-abiding character outside of criminal history.24 Of 
course, in effect, the first-timer discount operates to permit harsher 
punishment for recidivists.25 
Other, nontraditional retributivists articulate a slight variation on 
the discount orientation. The “progressive loss of mitigation theory” 
clarifies that harsher consequences for repeat offenders are not explicitly 
tied to their prior offending. Instead, recidivists simply become 
disenfranchised from deserving the mercy given to offenders with 
minimal or no criminal past.26 After a few transgressions, the individual 
depletes his entitlement to mitigation and thus deserves to be sentenced 
to the maximum proportional punishment for the instant offense.27 In 
other words, the existence of prior convictions negates the potential for 
 
 
21
  Nora V. Demleitner, Constitutional Challenges, Risk-Based Analysis, and Criminal 
History Databases: More Demand on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 17 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 159, 159 (2005). 
 
22
  Thomas Mahon, Justifying the Use of Previous Convictions as an Aggravating 
Factor at Sentencing, 2012 CORK ONLINE L. REV. 85, 90 (2012).  
Andrew von Hirsch, the main proponent of the progressive loss of mitigation 
theory, claims that going soft on first offenders and offenders with a small 
number of previous convictions is justified by the notion of lapse, which is 
supposedly part of our everyday moral judgments. He believes that this has its 
genesis in the fallibility of human nature and the view that a temporary 
breakdown of human control is the kind of frailty for which some 
understanding should be shown. Martin Wasik and von Hirsch note that in 
sentencing, the “lapse is an infringement of criminal law, rather than a more 
commonplace moral failure, but the logic of the first offender discount 
remains the same—that of dealing with a lapse more tolerantly.”  
Bagaric, supra note 19, at 370 (citing Martin Wasik & Andrew von Hirsch, Section 29 
Revised: Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 1994 CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1994)). 
 
23
  Mahon, supra note 22, at 90.  
 
24
  Id at 93. 
 
25
  Demleitner, supra note 21, at 159. 
 
26
  Bagaric, supra note 19, at 369. 
 
27
  Id. 
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moderating considerations.28 Note, though, that the progressive loss of 
mitigation theory would not recognize any continued increase in 
punishment for reoffending and thus would not countenance recidivist 
premiums per se.29 These theorists adhere to the idea that a just 
punishment must be proportional to the severity of the instant offense, 
and therefore, even for recidivists, the maximum cannot be higher than 
that justified solely by the present crime.30 The difference is that these 
progressive loss theorists believe in some variation among offenders of 
similar crimes below that maximum, depending on the absence of a 
significant criminal history.31 
Still, other retribution scholars embrace recidivist premiums, 
though they also provide differing accounts. One conceptualization 
centers on the retributive concern with an offender’s culpability. Here, 
the argument is that the defendant’s prior offenses are relevant to the 
extent that their existence can assist in arbitrating the offender’s 
culpability for the instant crime.32 Also, with a prior conviction, the 
person has been formally warned by the state of the consequences of 
disobeying the law, and his choice to disregard the law again justifies a 
greater penalty.33 Hence, under this reasoning, the recidivist’s failure to 
 
 
28
  Mahon, supra note 22, at 89; see also Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. P.S., [2009] 
I.E.C.C.A. 1 (“Accepting that in relation to the previous offences the applicant has 
already been punished and should not on the occasion of sentencing for the present 
offences be punished again for those former offences and that previous offending will 
normally be regarded as an absence of a mitigating factor.”). 
 
29
  Bagaric, supra note 19, at 369; Mahon, supra note 22, at 90 (“The discount model 
described above could not justify the recidivist premium as themes such as mercy and 
forgiveness lie at its heart, as opposed to the idea of desert. The theory explains why 
there should be some differential treatment between first offenders and those with 
criminal records. However, it cannot explain the intuition that a recidivist deserves 
more punishment.”). 
 
30
  Bagaric, supra note 19, at 369; Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality and the 
Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Some Further Reflections, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS 
AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 1, 1 (Julian V. Roberts & 
Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010) (“[F]irst offenders and those with very limited numbers 
of previous crimes should receive a mitigated sentence, but that once this mitigation has 
been lost, sentence severity should be unaffected by additional convictions.”). 
 
31
  Bagaric, supra note 19, at 369. 
 
32
  Lee, supra note 18; Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The 
Philosophical Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 595 
(2003). 
 
33
  Fisher, supra note 15, at 845; Demleitner, supra note 21, at 159 (“[A] prior criminal 
conviction should lead to enhanced punishment because the offender has already been 
warned and has proven himself unable or unwilling to follow society’s commands.”). 
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curb his criminal proclivities suggests his heightened culpability for the 
later offense.34 This justification has also been referred to as the 
omission theory. The omission liability perspective suggests that a 
person, once convicted by the state, is placed in a new position with 
respect to the law and society: he acquires an affirmative obligation to 
reform his life to avoid future criminality.35 Extra punishment is 
warranted if he fails to desist from further offending.36 Instead of a 
myopic view upon the instant offense, the omission theory observes the 
greater pattern of behavior, but still draws upon the retributive concern 
with culpability.37 
While not focused on a distinctly retributivist rationale, it is still 
of import to note that the Supreme Court, in approving a recidivist 
premium statute, recognized that the state maintains a legitimate interest 
“in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts 
have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms 
of society as established by its criminal law.”38 
2. Utilitarian Concerns 
In contrast to retribution’s backward-leaning perspective, 
utilitarian concerns are prospective in nature. The utilitarian mindset 
considers the potential benefits and consequences to society that a 
penalty may produce.39 While the retributivist condones punishment as 
constructive even to the offender himself, indeed advocating that a 
person who commits a crime is inviting a punitive consequence, the 
utilitarian does not necessarily view discipline as valuable for the 
 
 
34
  Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert, in PREVIOUS 
CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 49, 49 (Julian 
V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). “Some authorities suggest the purpose of 
enhanced punishment statutes is to increase the punishment of persons who have failed 
to learn to respect the law after suffering the initial penalties and embarrassment of a 
conviction.” John Kimpflen, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 2, 39 AM. 
JUR 2D (citing Hicks v. State, 595 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Gallegos, 941 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). 
 
35
  Mahon, supra note 22, at 91. 
 
36
  Id. 
 
37
  Id. 
 
38
  Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980). 
 
39
  Lee, supra note 18; Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences under 
Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 43 (2008) (“Utilitarian (or 
consequentialist) purposes of punishment focus on the desirable effects (mainly, future 
crime reduction) which punishments have on the offender being punished, or on other 
would-be offenders, and on the costs and undesired consequences of punishments.”). 
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offender.40 For utilitarianism, however, punishment can be appropriate 
because of the ensuing benefits for the individual and society.41 
The utilitarian classifications include theories involving 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Deterrence includes three 
models. Specific deterrence permits disciplining an individual to 
dissuade that person from reoffending,42 while general deterrence 
permits a penalty to inhibit others from committing a crime.43 Both 
specific and general deterrence operate through fear and the human 
desire to avoid negative consequences.44 The third variety represents a 
broader, societal mission. Sanctions are meant as expressive 
communications to establish and reinforce norms by acknowledging the 
harms caused by criminal violations and to situate an offense’s 
seriousness within the scheme of collective human existence.45 
More pointedly, criminal history information is relevant to 
specific deterrence because “individuals who have been convicted of 
one crime need enhanced penalties to be optimally deterred from re-
offending, for by engaging in criminal behavior in the past, such 
individuals have revealed their proclivity for criminal activity.”46 
Similarly, a recidivist premium is justified as the marginal utility of the 
deterrence value erodes for repeat offenders as compared to first 
offenders: 
[W]hen offenders have been subjected to prior criminal 
punishment, the formal sanction is eroded, resulting in a weaker 
deterrent effect than for first-time offenders. Individuals with 
criminal records have lower opportunity costs; the marginal cost 
of the first years behind bars is lower than the marginal cost of 
subsequent imprisonment years, and the additional reputation 
costs entailed in a greater number of convictions decrease as the 
number of convictions rises.47 
Utilitarians can also be consequentialist in endorsing recidivist 
premiums. Extra penalties foster trust in the justice system by limiting 
the “revolving door” phenomenon in which a repeat offender recycles 
 
 
40
  Bagaric, supra note 19, at 346. 
 
41
  Id. 
 
42
  State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007); State v. Baker, 970 So. 2d 948 (La. 
2007). 
 
43
  Baker, 970 So. 2d at 948. 
 
44
  Frase, supra note 39, at 43. 
 
45
  Id. at 43. 
 
46
  Fisher, supra note 15, at 844. 
 
47
  Id. at 844-45. 
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through prison doors.48 
Another utilitarian concern is the use of punishment for 
incapacitation purposes. Again, prior criminal history is viewed as a 
proxy for future offending,49 and thus may signify a need to protect 
society from those considered likely to be undeterred by the threat of 
additional penalties. In this respect, recidivist premiums are designed to 
shield innocent citizens from potential harms by restraining career 
criminals.50 From a law and economics vantage, the 
repeat offender has demonstrated by his behavior a propensity 
for committing crimes. Therefore, by imprisoning him for a 
longer time we can expect to prevent more crimes during his 
period of imprisonment than we would do if we imprisoned a 
first offender, whose propensities are harder to predict, for the 
same period. The same prison resources “buy” a greater 
reduction in crime.51 
Importantly, the Supreme Court has approved the use of 
recidivist tariffs for deterrence52 or incapacitation.53 
The final utilitarian theory concerns rehabilitation. Criminal 
history is a critical component for rehabilitation models. On the one 
hand, prior offending is conceived as a surrogate for low rehabilitative 
potential.54 On the other hand, the evidence-based practices movement 
has reintroduced the positive potential of rehabilitation for offenders 
who are amenable to change. Reliance upon evidence-based correctional 
programming may lower crime rates. In this new reincarnation, styled 
creatively as “neorehabilitation,” past criminal history is re-envisioned 
as indicative of criminogenic needs that can be targeted in order to 
reduce recidivism.55 
 
 
48
  Id. at 845. 
 
49
  BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007). 
 
50
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B. History and Risk of Criminal Offending in Policy 
In sum, various theories of punishment in correctional contexts 
either are retrospective in focus (e.g., retribution) or future-oriented 
(e.g., deterrence and incapacitation). Still, each theory, including 
rehabilitation, possesses the capacity to incorporate criminal history as a 
meaningful criterion in a host of criminal justice decisions. Indeed, there 
is a long tradition for employing criminal history measures to drive 
correctional policies and to determine individual consequences. More 
recently, the recent turn in penology56 has incorporated more refined 
predictions of future risk into those same policies and decisions. 
Officials have appropriately engaged science to identify risk prediction 
technologies within modern evidence-based correctional schemes. 
Notably, risk technologies have, in turn, tended to rely heavily upon 
measures of criminal history in their recidivism prediction methods as 
studies support the correlation between antisocial background and future 
recidivism.57 Still, in some sense criminal history is reified in the future 
risk technologies world. This subsection will briefly discuss the short 
history of risk assessment in criminal justice, summarize the role of prior 
offense record, and introduce some of the more popular actuarial risk 
assessment instruments. 
1. Role of Risk in Criminal Justice Decisions 
In the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. criminal justice system 
embraced what was then considered a progressive model that 
highlighted rehabilitation.58 A normative turn in the 1980s emanating 
from political campaigns touting “law and order” justice altered public 
and legislative opinions and fundamentally reversed the tide away from 
the rehabilitative model toward tougher sanctions.59 Another seismic 
shift has recently gained traction with the evidence-based practices 
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  Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging 
Strategy of Corrections and its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (1992) (using 
the term to refer to the movement toward new discourses involving probability and risk, 
honing systemic internal processes, and deindividualizing techniques in correctional 
practices). 
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  Christopher Baird, A Question of Evidence: A Critique of Risk Assessment Models 
Used in the Justice System, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 7 (2009), 
http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/special-report-evidence.pdf. 
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  Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 4 
WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 151, 158 (2014). 
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  Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America: 1975–2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 146–47 
(2013). 
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movement. The United States’ economic woes and its world record 
incarceration rate have convinced numerous policymakers to adapt again 
and implement new strategies.60 The contemporary approach seeks to 
achieve multiple goals: manage costs and resources, constrain 
overdependence on imprisonment, utilize effective alternative 
rehabilitative programming, reduce recidivism risk, and simultaneously 
improve overall public safety.61 An evidence-oriented model aims to 
profit from the best data available via the empirical sciences—to identify 
and classify individuals based on their potential risk of reoffending and 
criminogenic needs and to manage offender populations accordingly.62 
An additional balancing act must be respected. Well-informed 
policies are critical to achieving a proper balance among interests such 
as protecting the public and efficiently using government resources, 
while at the same time respecting individuals’ liberty interests.63 The 
ideology of risk is now considered at the heart of such a balancing act. 
Information about a defendant’s risk of recidivism informs an expanding 
number and variety of criminal justice decisions.64 The risk principle 
promotes correctional strategies for supervision and treatment that are 
finely attuned to the individual’s risk level.65 Risk-based philosophies 
now endorse a “preventive, future-oriented logic of risk.”66 
At least a majority of states currently use risk-based assessments 
in their sentencing systems.67 Plus, almost all states use a risk 
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PEW CTR. ON THE STATES 1 (2011). 
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(2013). 
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ISSUE 20:1 SPRING 2015 
2015 THE INFLUENCE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY ON RISK ASSESSMENTS 89 
assessment tool at some point in the criminal justice process.68 The 
evidence-based movement initially centered on studies indicating that 
proper programming can assist high-risk offenders in reducing their 
recidivism rates.69 In contrast, a more recent realization has highlighted 
the potential negative corollaries of over programming. According to 
numerous studies, providing low risk offenders with overly restrictive 
conditions of supervision, requiring intrusive programming, or placing 
them with higher-risk inmates can often be counterproductive in that 
those interventions actually increase recidivism rates in low-risk 
populations.70 Thus, risk is considered the modern savior for criminal 
justice reform in multiple contexts. 
2. Reliance Upon Criminal History 
Importantly, criminal history is the “staple” of future risk 
strategies,71 with the two now converging in critical ways. The situation 
felicitously imitates the philosophy rhetorically staged by William 
Shakespeare in his play The Tempest in which a major character 
declares: “[W]hat’s past is prologue.”72 The key phrase here is based on 
the notion that past behavior is predictive of future behavior. Studies 
somewhat consistently show that prior offense history is predictive of 
future reoffending.73 Still, the relationship is not perfect. Empirical work 
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  Sheldon X. Zhang at al., An Analysis of Prisoner Reentry and Parole Risk Using 
COMPAS and Traditional Criminal History Measures, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 167, 170 
(2014) (“For political and pragmatic reasons, the criminal justice system must consider 
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COMTY CORRS. 3, 6 (2004), available at http://www.yourhonor.com/dwi/sentencing/ 
RiskPrinciple.pdf. 
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  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1. 
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  William Rhodes et al., Recidivism of Offenders on Federal Community Supervision 
12 (2012); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL 368 (2008) (indicating 
criminal history factors included in the Guidelines “are consistent with the extant 
empirical research assessing correlates of recidivism and patterns of career criminal 
behavior”); GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: 
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Violations, 67 FED. PROBATION 31, 35 (2003). 
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on repeat behaviors in general shows variations can occur. Among other 
mediating factors, opportunity and situational context also affect the 
replication of prior behavior.74 For instance, a rapist may not reoffend 
simply because he is unable to find an available victim. Or, the 
evidence-based practices initiative may properly reduce risk by focusing 
on meeting the individual’s criminogenic needs and changing his path 
toward pro-social choices. 
The empirical correlation with prospective criminality appears to 
support recidivist premiums. Correctional guideline systems now 
commonly apply some type of supervisory enhancement to apply based 
on criminal record.75 As a United States Sentencing Commission study 
released in 2004 concluded, the “empirical evidence shows that criminal 
history as a risk measurement tool has statistically significant power in 
distinguishing between recidivists and non-recidivists.”76 
Criminal history measures have become the bedrock of risk 
assessment practices, too. Criminal history anchors are among what 
have been referred to as the “big four” criminogenic risk factors for 
criminal recidivism; the others include pro-criminal attitudes, pro-
criminal associates, and antisocial personality.77 In forensic terms, 
criminal history is most often considered a static risk factor.78 But 
Michael Tonry more appropriately describes criminal history as a 
“variable marker,” which he describes as a fixed characteristic that may 
be subject to change.79 Criminal history may be supplemented with 
additional criminal offending. Criminal history is also modifiable by 
correcting erroneous information (such as a mistaken notation of an 
arrest or correction for an official exoneration). This latter variation is 
consistent with the Back to the Future symbolism of reliving and 
retrofitting the past, albeit with the consequence of altering the future. 
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16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39, 46 (2010). 
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  Id. at 45. 
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  Tonry, supra note 2, at 172 (finding that other examples of risk factors that are often 
considered static but in reality are subject to change include age, religion, sexual 
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3. Risk Assessment Tools 
The employment of mostly automated tools—fundamentally 
actuarial in nature—that capitalize on the ideology of risk is at its prime 
in terms of its influence across criminal justice domains.80 The new 
penology movement has energized a legion of scholars and scientists 
alike to develop various risk assessment methodologies. Risk assessment 
as science and practice is presently a competitive industry with both 
governmental and for-profit businesses issuing a host of instruments that 
are either generic in nature or targeted to specific groups (e.g., men, 
children, mentally disordered) or offense types (e.g., sex offenders, 
domestic abusers).81 The following concise description is apt: 
“Recidivism prediction is ubiquitous. Everybody’s doing it. There is an 
enormous academic and professional literature. Unprecedented private 
sector involvement has occurred in designing and marketing instruments 
and providing services to government.”82 Some of the tools are 
proprietary, requiring license fees from users.83 Others are in the public 
domain, available for use without additional costs.84 
Actuarial risk methodologies derive statistical models from 
group samples. Vehicle insurance provides a recognizable illustration. 
The risk of concern with insurance is a policy claim. Thus, insurance 
agents are interested in predicting the likelihood of claims being made 
on the policy. Automobile insurance companies assign policy rates to 
individual applicants based on predictive statistics derived from 
historical, group-based claims data. For car insurance, the common 
relevant factors include age, gender, marital status, vehicle model, and 
driving record.85 The general idea of actuarial rankings for any risk at 
issue is to identify those factors that correlate to the future event at issue. 
The rankings then attempt to assign appropriate weights to each factor 
based on the statistical recognition that some factors achieve greater 
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predictive ability than others.86 Thus, developers of actuarial instruments 
manipulate existing data in an empirical way to create rules. These rules 
combine the more significant factors, assign applicable weights, and 
create final mechanistic rankings.87 
Understanding the group-based nature of actuarial assessment 
tools is crucial. When attempting to determine the relative risk for an 
individual, the assessor’s final score for the person is compared to those 
in the population(s) upon which the actuarial model was based. The 
individual’s risk level is ranked according to the frequency of the risk 
having been observed to occur in the development samples.88 
To return to the automobile insurance example, the insurance 
agent would input a prospective customer’s data into the actuarial model 
to obtain a comparative risk level based on the experiential claims data 
from those in the historical sample(s) with similar scores.89 
Models for estimating recidivism risk are now in their fourth 
generation. First-generation assessment preceded the turn to the actuarial 
model and consisted of clinical judgments by mental health 
professionals.90 Second-generation assessments introduced scoring 
instruments of variables that were statistically shown to correlate with 
recidivism.91 The focus of second-generation instruments was on risk 
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Zhang et al., supra note 68, at 169.  
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(without consideration of rehabilitation needs), and they were intended 
to be brief and efficiently scored.92 Examples of second-generation 
instruments are the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG),93 Static-
99,94 and the federal Pre-Trial Risk Assessment tool (PTRA).95 VRAG 
remains the most popular tool to assess violent recidivism; it contains 
twelve factors, including age, marital status, and psychopathy.96 Two 
factors in VRAG score on criminal history measures: nonviolent 
criminal history score and failure on prior conditional release.97 Static-
99 is the most widely used for sexual recidivism. It contains ten static 
factors, including variables respecting victim type, plus age and 
cohabitation history.98 Five of the Static-99 variables index criminal 
offending events, such as number of prior sex offense charges, prior 
non-contact sex offenses, current non-sexual violence convictions, prior 
non-sexual violence convictions, and number of prior sentencing dates. 
A more recently created instrument (though it still qualifies within the 
second-generation genre) is the federal probation office’s PTRA tool. 
Out of the eleven items that PTRA scores, six deal with prior criminal 
offenses: number of felony convictions, number of prior failures to 
appear, pending offenses, current offense type, current offense class, and 
age at probation interview.99 
The third generation’s scientific advancements entail: (a) a 
combined actuarial assessment with directed professional judgment, and 
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(b) integrated static with dynamic factors.100 Static risk factors normally 
are historical, unchangeable, and generally not amenable to 
interventions.101 Dynamic factors incorporate criminogenic needs, which 
are often mutable in nature, and therefore may become proper targets for 
rehabilitative interventions.102 The Level of Service Inventory-Revised 
(LSI-R), a third-generation tool,103 is a structured professional judgment 
instrument and is the most commonly used generic risk-needs tool 
across U.S. criminal justice agencies.104 The LSI-R contains 54 items, 
ten of which represent various criminal record enhancements, such as 
prior convictions, prior incarceration, arrests before age 16, and 
supervision violations.105 
In the latest iteration, fourth-generation assessments 
supplemented the risk-needs combination with responsivity principles 
and a longer perspective on case management (spanning from intake 
through case closure).106 “Responsivity is defined as tailoring case plans 
to the individual characteristics, circumstances, and learning style of 
each offender.”107 Fourth-generation tools are often automated with 
technological applications employing algorithmic scoring. The federal 
probation system developed its Post Conviction Risk Assessment 
(PCRA) as a fourth-generation, software-based tool.108 The PCRA 
scores a variety of static and dynamic factors, including education, 
employment, substance abuse, family problems, and pro-criminal 
attitudes.109 More specifically, PCRA contains six separately scored 
criminal history items involving offense types, arrests, and supervision 
 
 
100
  Fass et al., supra note 91. 
 
101
  Id. at 1096. 
 
102
  Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender 
Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (1996). 
 
103
  Pinals et al., supra note 93, at 56. 
 
104
  Memorandum from Vera, supra note 67. 
 
105
  David J. Simourd & P. Bruce Malcolm, Reliability and Validity of the Level of 
Service Inventory-Revised Among Federally Incarcerated Sex Offenders, 13 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 261, 264 (1998). 
 
106
  Fass et al., supra note 91, at 1096. 
 
107
  Winnie Ore & Chris Baird, Beyond Risk and Needs Assessments, NAT’L COUNCIL 
ON CRIME & DELINQ. 8 (March 2014), http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/ 
files/publication_pdf/beyond-risk-needs-assessments.pdf. 
 
108
  Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment 
(PCRA): A Construction and Validation Study, 10 PSYCHOL. SERVICES 87, 88 (2013). 
 
109
  James L. Johnson et al., The Construction and Validation of the Federal Post 
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failures.110 
The following is a positive reflection upon the proposed value of 
the current state of risk-needs tools: 
Risk assessment tools now under consideration are more 
transparent, rely on data, and attempt to regularize th[e] instinct 
[to predict risk] and subject it to more scientifically rigorous 
examinations. Ensuring uniform application and the unbiased 
use of available data, these modern predictive tools are 
facilitated by the use of “structured, empirically-driven and 
theoretically driven” instruments.111 
III.  OBJECTIFYING CRIMINAL HISTORY 
The general public might surmise that criminal justice officials 
would naturally represent fair and measured managers who efficiently 
expend governmental resources. Citizens expect legislatures, law 
commissions, and the judiciary to implement educated and balanced 
correctional systems that avoid over-penalization and primarily focus on 
higher risk defendants. Correctional professionals certainly have 
extensive experience with classifying and managing their populations 
with an eye on antisocial proclivity, which in turn may be predicated on 
prior offending. 
Supporters might presume that measures meant to qualify and 
quantify prior criminal records are ascertainable, transparent, and 
impartial. As well, proponents might reckon that official records are 
readily available and constitute trustworthy sources of information. 
Despite these plausible expectations, the current state of sentencing and 
other correctional practices serve to objectify criminal history in 
concerning ways. Indeed, risk assessment tools commonly operate to 
conflate criminal past with future recidivism potential. 
Several concerning issues are revealed in this section. 
Unfortunately, the criminal history-to-future risk combination has 
surreptitiously multiplied the impact of prior offending through the guise 
of what will be colloquially referred to as n-tuple counting and pseudo 
three-strikes policies. Additionally, risk assessment tools’ translation of 
evidence sufficient to compute criminal history measures is questioned 
 
 
110
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herein. Popular risk instruments tend to accredit as a criminal record any 
alleged offenses, acquitted conduct, and juvenile deviance. As a result, 
criminal history as a construct is created, objectified, and magnified 
through systemic, risk-based procedures. This resonates with the movie 
Back to the Future.  Marty McFly was warned that the changes he 
makes during his visit to his past might consequently alter his future.112 
Here, the theme is meant to suggest that officials revisit an offender’s 
past—potentially reframe it incorrectly—and thereby constructively 
alter the future in terms of the criminal justice consequences to the 
individual. 
A. The Exponential Ratchet of Criminal History 
The prior section provided an overview of risk assessment tools 
and referred to the frequency with which recidivism risk instruments 
incorporate criminal history-related factors. An appropriate starting 
place to a critical analysis of these ramifications is the notion of 
duplication. This issue is based on the recognition that most jurisdictions 
already incorporated attributes of offense history into various criminal 
justice outcomes, whether formally or not. As an example, many states 
include recidivist premiums in their sentencing systems in some way. 
The sentencing result can occur as a direct component of sentence length 
determinations, via mandatory minimums, three-strikes laws, career 
criminal enhancements, or through incorporation of criminal history into 
sentencing recommendations. Prior convictions have an even longer 
tenure as an informal driver in discretionary decisions on penalty 
determinations.113 Further, criminal history is heavily relied upon in 
 
 
112
  BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures 1985, 1989, 1990). 
 
113
  A nineteenth century legal philosopher opined on these issues: 
The rules as nearly as they can be defined for dealing with old offenders may 
be thus stated. Careful inquiry should be made into the nature the former 
charge the length of time that has since elapsed what the prisoner has been 
doing during the interval if he has been pursuing an honest calling or 
otherwise in short if this second offence as well as the first wears the 
complexion rather of accidental or occasional than of professional or habitual 
crime so it shall prove then one more chance should be given to the convict 
but of course with a lengthened sentence of imprisonment and with emphatic 
warning that it is the last escape will have from penal servitude. If on the hand 
the history of the criminal before and the former conviction or the nature of 
that or of present crime indicates that he is a professional criminal mercy in 
such case is wasted upon him and is injustice to the community. The truest to 
both is to remove him for a long period from his habits haunts and associates 
and to relieve from the presence of one who would certainly continue to prey 
upon it while he is at large because crime is his profession because he knows 
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other correctional contexts. Criminal history resonates in responses 
spanning a defendant’s time under correctional control—from pretrial 
bail decisions through post-sentence release conditions.114 As a result, 
the impact of any prior offending behavior can become replicated and 
multiplied many times over. The replication can potentially lead to 
disproportionately severe punishment, unnecessary restrictions, or 
inappropriate programming. For instance, a prior violent offense may 
mean the defendant is denied bail, sentenced to prison and for a longer 
period, assigned a high risk security rating in the institution, prohibited 
from participating in educational and occupational opportunities, denied 
parole, and/or assigned a longer post-release supervision period with 
greater restrictions. Of course, these types of duplicative and 
overlapping outcomes have already been occurring, albeit largely 
without proper reflection and without measures to curb their 
multiplicative impacts. The key point here is that these problems are 
exacerbated when a risk penology regime independently tallies the same 
or similar criminal history measures and the risk prediction level 
increases accordingly. Such a reality has seemingly remained unnoticed 
across criminal justice domains. 
1. N-Tuple Counting 
The same prior criminal event may operate to lengthen the 
defendant’s penalty both directly (with the criminal history score in 
guideline sentencing or other official recidivist premiums) and indirectly 
if the higher actuarial risk result is factored into an even longer sentence 
and/or other correctional restrictions. The issue is that criminal history 
may be double-counted. Triple-counting, quadruple-counting, quintuple-
counting—and so forth—can also occur. Such an exponential result 
underlies what is meant herein by the term n-tuple. A parole system 
already formally considers a prior violent offense to be a negative factor 
in the parole decision. If that same prior violent crime is also computed 
in a risk assessment score, likely increasing the level of predicted risk 
result, the impact of the prior act of violence in terms of risk prediction 
is duplicated in the decision-making process. In other words, the effect 
of a single incident can be multiplied, albeit without the decision maker 
 
no other calling and because he prefers it with all its hazards to honest 
industry. 
EDWARD WILLIAM COX, THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT: AS APPLIED IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW BY JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES 147–48 (1877). 
 
114
  Fass et al., supra note 91, at 1096. 
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necessarily being cognizant of the overlap. The risk prediction will 
likely be higher than appropriate and the consequences to the individual 
may also be magnified. 
Another reason for the n-tuple effect arises within the risk 
technologies themselves. Many risk instruments assign points more than 
once for a single prior criminal event, particularly those that maintain 
numerous and overlapping criminal offending items in their scoring 
sheets.115 For instance, six of the nine variables in a sexual recidivism 
risk tool with the acronym Mn-SOST developed in Minnesota (and used 
in other jurisdictions) may have overlapping consequences as all involve 
convictions, events in prison, and release conditions. A hypothetical 
offender convicted of stalking and forcing sexual contact with a male 
victim in a public place and who was released after serving time without 
supervision would be scored in six of the nine categories.116 This risk 
scoring represents a sextuple effect of the same course of conduct. 
Additional examples may provide further context for potential n-
tuple effects. The federal post-conviction tool, PCRA, would double 
count a juvenile assault arrest.117 The LSI-R may duplicate by scoring 
separate measures on prior adult convictions, arrests, charges, parole 
violations, and other official records of violence.118 Static-99, the 
popular sexual recidivism instrument, tallies separately the number of 
prior sex offenses, any convictions of non-contact sexual offenses, 
number of prior sentencing dates, convictions for non-sexual offenses, 
and convictions of non-sexual violence.119 The California Static Risk 
Assessment is an automated actuarial tool using rap sheets that is 
entirely based on a weighted counting of 18 criminal history factors, 
many of which overlap.120 
 
 
115
  OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS., FEDERAL POST CONVICTION RISK 
ASSESSMENT: SCORING GUIDE §§1.1-1.7 (2011) (scoring on juvenile arrests; prior 
misdemeanor and felony arrests; varied offending pattern; supervised release violation; 
institutional misconduct; age at first admission). 
 
116
  Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool – 3.1 (MnSOST-3.1) Coding Rules, MINN. 
DEP’T. OF CORRS. 24 (2012), http://www.doc.state.mn.us/pages/files/large-
files/Publications/MnSOST3-1DOCReport.pdf (scoring (1) predatory offense sentence, 
(2) felony sentence, (3) stalking, (4) unsupervised release, (5) male victim, (6) crime in 
a public place). 
 
117
  OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS., FEDERAL POST CONVICTION RISK 
ASSESSMENT: SCORING GUIDE §§ 1.3, 1.7 (2011). This event would count a third time as 
a rated but not scored variable in PCRA. Id. at §1.1. 
 
118
  N.S.W. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., LSI-R TRAINING MANUAL 13–15 (2002). 
 
119
  Hanson & Thornton, supra note 98, at 122. 
 
120
  Turner & Gerlinger, supra note 83, at 1040. 
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A state-specific risk model developed in Pennsylvania, one 
designed for use in sentencing and by parole authorities, adopts another 
form of double-dipping in which a former arrest can count twice (e.g., in 
the total number of prior arrests factor and then again, if applicable, in 
the queries about prior drug arrests or prior property arrests).121 
Pennsylvania’s state sentencing commission has at least flagged a 
potential problem with this result. In an interim report, issued during the 
agency’s current efforts to establish the state’s own risk-based regime 
for sentencing and parole guideline purposes (as required by recent 
legislation), the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing posited: 
[I]s it appropriate to consider factors that are closely linked to 
those already considered by the guidelines? . . . The issue for 
utilizing prior arrests is primarily whether counting both prior 
arrests and prior convictions would be considered “double 
dipping” and potentially punishing an offender twice for the 
same conduct (i.e., a prior arrest and prior conviction for the 
same crime).122 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence in the public domain that the 
state commission has further considered, much less resolved, the query 
agency officials properly raised. 
In sum, with current risk assessment actuarial models, the impact 
of the same criminal history event(s) can become distorted by producing 
exponential effects. Surely, the resulting risk predictions can, as a result, 
become unduly inflated without proper attention. Then the responding 
criminal justice outcome might become more serious or restrictive. 
Through this guise, the criminal record is reimagined (as in Back to the 
Future) and negatively alters the individual’s future. A variation on the 
theme of a ratchet of future consequences from criminal history is next 
theorized in the form of unofficial recidivist premiums. 
2. Pseudo Three-Strikes Penalties 
Outside the context of risk assessment tools, commentators and 
litigants have challenged the constitutionality of three-strikes type 
sentencing statutes and career criminal sentence enhancements. These 
provisions “commonly double, triple, or quadruple the punishment 
 
 
121
  John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk 
Assessment in Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 158, 163 app. 2 (2014). 
 
122
  Factors that Predict Recidivism for Various Types of Offenders, PA. COMM’N ON 
SENT’G 12 (2011), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-
evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/interim-report-3-factors-that-predict-recidivism-for-
various-types-of-offenders/view.  
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imposed on repeat offenders.”123 It is the case that the Supreme Court 
has on several occasions ruled that a double jeopardy violation does not 
occur when the sentence for the instant offense is increased because of 
prior offending, even when the defendant had previously been convicted 
and punished for the prior offense.124 Nonetheless, the Court’s reasoning 
is rather nimble in this regard. 
In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes, we have 
rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced 
punishment imposed for the later offense is not to be viewed as 
either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes, 
but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is 
considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive 
one.125 
Thus, the Court uses rhetorical devices to discount the 
attribution of additional punishment, even though the sentence 
enhancement is a direct repercussion of the prior conviction.126 Instead, 
the supplemental sentence is characterized as representing merely an 
aggravator to the current offense, albeit triggered by the prior offense 
acting as evidence of a propensity for crime.127 This justification harkens 
to the more flexible retributivist argument that prior offending may be 
appropriately considered as evidence of enhanced culpability for the 
latter crime. In any event, it is difficult to digest the idea of formal 
recidivist premiums not qualifying as extra punishment for the former 
conviction.128 It is quite possible the Court was concerned with the 
 
 
123
  Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1435 (2001). 
 
124
  Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 398 (1995) (“[W]e specifically have rejected 
the claim that double jeopardy principles bar a later prosecution or punishment for 
criminal activity where that activity has been considered at sentencing for a separate 
crime.”). 
 
125
  Id. at 400 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
126
  Id. at 400–01 (“[B]y authorizing the consideration of offender-specific information 
at sentencing without the procedural protections attendant at a criminal trial, our cases 
necessarily imply that such consideration does not result in ‘punishment’ for such 
conduct.”). 
 
127
  Kimpflen, supra note 34 (“Recidivist statues do not violate the ex post facto clauses 
of the U.S. Constitution, because they do not punish a defendant for his or her prior 
convictions, but instead punish the defendant for his or her latest offense on the basis of 
a demonstrated propensity for misconduct.”). 
 
128
  Bender, supra note 2, at 314; see also Mahon, supra note 22, at 95–96 (“Evidence 
of recidivism alone cannot justify an increase in punishment. What is it about recidivist 
offending that justifies the increased punishment? Obviously to punish a person twice is 
unjust and it violates two key virtues of the criminal justice system-that of certainty and 
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slippery slope. For example, the Court’s majority opinion in one of these 
cases had noted the long history of considering prior antisocial 
behaviors, whether or not they resulted in formal convictions, when 
determining sentences: “sentencing courts have not only taken into 
consideration a defendant’s prior convictions, but have also considered a 
defendant’s past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from 
that behavior.”129 If formal recidivist premium laws would be 
overturned, all consideration of prior offense history might then be off 
limits. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the idea of formal and 
informal recidivist premiums. Considering that a prior conviction, for 
which the person has already been punished, and entailing a process 
which earns a high level of substantive and procedural process,130 fails 
to violate double jeopardy in the context of sentencing, then surely the 
reliance on criminal history for other correctional outcomes does not 
either. Nonetheless, it remains important to emphasize that the 
employment of criminal history criteria to increase risk assessment 
scores may unwittingly be acting as unofficial and clandestine three-
strikes or habitual offender enhancement. As previously outlined, 
correctional sanctions escalate in the individual’s current situation 
based, directly or indirectly, on evidence of prior bad acts by driving up 
risk prediction scores. The term “pseudo three-strikes” is meant to 
characterize this issue generally. The pseudo three-strikes result is a 
supplemental form of recidivist premium acting through the medium of 
risk assessment practices. 
The potential for an exponential ratchet for prior behaviors 
through the guise of risk predictions endures, though it is largely 
overlooked and, therefore, unregulated. Plus, as with the n-tuple 
counting previously posited, the consequences to the individual are real. 
Society may suffer too, as the cost to the state will unnecessarily rise. 
Indeed, it is troubling that criminal justice officials, policymakers, 
academics, and forensic science professionals working with risk 
assessment have seemingly remained largely oblivious of the n-tuple 
counting and potential pseudo three-strikes effects of combining direct 
 
finality.”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 466 (2000) (noting 
“serious ethical issues in punishing a person more severely on the basis of past crimes 
already once punished”). 
 
129
  Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994). 
 
130
  Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at 
Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 53–55 (2011). 
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criminal history measures with risk predictions, considering the 
replication possibilities. Probable fallouts are legion and should be more 
formally considered and debated in the future, including the potential for 
the following broad concerns: excessive risk attributions; 
disproportionality in sanctions; lack of transparency; inefficient resource 
allocation; and unjustified infringement on liberty and privacy interests. 
In sum, the evidence-based practices movement—meaning the lawyers, 
policymakers, correctional professionals, and scientists working 
therein—may be missing important opportunities to critically assess 
potential flaws in their methodologies and applications and to institute 
appropriate corrective measures. 
3. Ancillary Unintended Consequences 
In spite of continued adherenece for various recidivist premiums 
amongst conservative groups, little empirical evidence exists to support 
that they function as expected in the first place. There is insufficient 
confirmatory data that increasing sentence length or using imprisonment 
to deter and incapacitate offenders predicted to be at high risk are 
effective at reducing recidivism or crime rates.131 Further, there is a 
paucity of empirical research to validate the efficacy of recidivist 
premium sanctions,132 which makes their use questionable in a 
purportedly evidence-based practice system. 
Moreover, potential unintended consequences of recidivist 
premiums have been noted. First, instead of enhanced penalties to deter 
repeat offenders, they may encourage repeat offenders to employ violent 
methods to avoid capture. 
[T]here is some evidence that the hefty recidivist premium 
mandated by the new recidivist laws may encourage the violent 
behavior it is meant to deter. As police officers from states with 
 
 
131
  Roberts & Yalincak, supra note 14, at 278 n.12 (listing sources); Cassia Spohn & 
David Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates of Felony Offenders: 
A Focus on Drug Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 352 (2002) (finding defendants 
“sentenced to prison failed more often and more quickly than offenders placed on 
probation”). 
 
132
  Roberts & Yalincak, supra note 14, at 278 (citing Lila Kazemian, Assessing the 
Impact of a Recidivist Sentencing Premium on Crime and Recidivism Rates, in 
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 227 
(Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010) (“[W]hile this policy [a repeat 
offense premium] is intended to serve a utilitarian function, the empirical evidence on 
the incarceration-reoffending link has suggested that cumulative sentencing policies do 
not fulfil [sic] this mandate.”)). 
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harsh and wide-ranging recidivist statutes report, an offender 
who otherwise would not have intended to use violence may 
change her mind and kill her victim, a police officer, or even a 
witness to avoid apprehension and a mandatory life sentence 
without the possibility of parole.133 
Second, critics have recognized, with the support of research 
studies, that incarceration often is criminogenic itself, and thus may 
actually exacerbate recidivism risk.134 Other experts acknowledge the 
likely diminishing returns of the increased rate of imprisonment with 
reductions in crime.135 At the same time, recidivist premiums may 
operate to increase the risk of future reoffending by interfering with 
successful reentry.136 
Consider the case of likely recidivists who are disproportionately 
denied parole or sentenced under enhanced statutes and are 
therefore disproportionately represented in prisons. The 
symbolic message associated with this disproportionate 
representation- that is, with the correct perception that prisons 
are “filled with recidivists” - is the following: “If you offend 
once, you are likely to offend again; if you offend twice, it’s all 
over.” The result is a powerful symbolic message that turns 
convicts into even worse offenders-in the public imagination, but 
also in the reentry context. This too will have the effect of a self-
fulfilling prophecy, reducing employment and education 
opportunities upon reentry.137 
Finally, habitual offender policies are considered partly 
responsible for the increase in prison population sizes in the United 
States.138 These policies contribute to the country’s current state of mass 
 
 
133
  Dubber, supra note 20, at 708. 
 
134
  See Francis T. Cullen et al., Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of 
Ignoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 48S (Supp. 2011) (reviewing studies, concluding 
“the use of custodial sanctions may have the unanticipated consequence of making 
society less safe”); Daniel P. Mears et al., Gender Differences in the Effect of Prison on 
Recidivism, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 370, 375 (2010) (finding imprisonment produced modest 
criminogenic effect); Robert DeFina & Lance Hannon, For Incapacitation, There is No 
Time Like the Present: The Lagged Effects of Prisoner Reentry on Property and Violent 
Crime Rates, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 1004, 1013 (2010) (concluding “any crime-reducing 
benefits of increased incarceration are completely wiped out by the crime-promoting 
effects associated with the increasing prevalence of ex-inmates”). 
 
135
  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 51–52 (2007); Anne 
Morrison Piehl & Bert Useem, Prisons, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 532, 542 (James 
Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011). 
 
136
  HARCOURT, supra note 49, at 164. 
 
137
  Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 
138
  Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. 
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incarceration in that “once incarceration reaches a critical level, the 
criminogenic nature of the prison experience and the resilience of 
American institutions of criminal justice in reabsorbing and recycling 
recidivists (‘net-widening’) reinforce the phenomenon.”139 
B. Nonadjudicated Criminal History 
Formal recidivist premiums usually require official convictions 
to trigger them. Most risk tool measures of past offending do not limit 
themselves to convictions. Depending on the instrument, a variety of 
measures are counted, including arrests,140 charges,141 parole/probation 
revocations,142 other types of supervision violations,143 incarceration,144 
other official records,145 or self-report.146 Generally, coding rules for 
many instruments do not exclude counting any of the aforementioned 
even if the individual was otherwise officially exonerated, such as via an 
acquittal, police decision not to arrest, or prosecutorial declination based 
on insufficient evidence. In other words, risk instruments tend to 
 
REV. 1203, 1211, 1252 (2012). 
 
139
  Id. at 1252 (emphasis added). 
 
140
  Johnson et al., supra note 109; N.S.W. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., supra note 
118, at 19–20; QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 97, at 239. 
 
141
  Federal Pretrial, supra note 95, at 7; Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool, supra 
note 116; Validation of Risk Scale, PA. COMM’N ON SENT’G 6 tbl. 1 (2013), 
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-
assessment/interim-report-7-validation-of-risk-scale/view; Hanson & Thornton, supra 
note 98. 
 
142
  N.S.W. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., supra note 118, at 15; QUINSEY ET AL., supra 
note 97, at 238; CHRISTOPHER D. WEBSTER ET AL., HCR-20: ASSESSING RISK FOR 
VIOLENCE 11 (1997).  
 
143
  Johnson et al., supra note 109; Thomas Blomberg et al., Validation of the Compas 
Risk Assessment Classification Instrument, CTR. FOR CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBL. POLICY 
15 (2010), http://criminology.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/Validation-of-the-COMPAS-
Risk-Assessment-Classification-Instrument.pdf; N.S.W. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., 
supra note 118, at 19–20; QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 97, at 238. 
 
144
  N.S.W. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., supra note 118, at 19–20. 
 
145
  Federal Pretrial, supra note 95; OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS., FEDERAL 
POST CONVICTION RISK ASSESSMENT: SCORING GUIDE §1.1 (2011) (“Count all contact 
with law enforcement resulting from criminal conduct or status offenses (truancy, 
curfew violations, run-away). Count arrests and referrals to court for all offenses 
(including traffic). Consider official records and self-report.”); N.S.W. DEP’T. OF 
CORRECTIVE SERVS., supra note 15. 
 
146
  Shannon Toney Smith et al., Adapting the HCR-20
V3
 for Pre-trial Settings, 13 INT’L 
J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 160, 169 (2014); Federal Pretrial, supra note 95, at 7; 
OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS., FEDERAL POST CONVICTION RISK ASSESSMENT: 
SCORING GUIDE §1.3 (2011). 
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presume that any evidence—even circumstantial—of prior offending 
behavior must be truthful and accurate as proving the occurrence of such 
behavior, and accordingly deserves to be tallied to increase the risk 
profile. This scenario is generally the case regardless of the evidence 
actually obtained and/or events occurring afterward that might refute 
such allegations. 
Three main problems result. An initial and overarching issue is 
that such an assessment violates the espoused tenet of western criminal 
law systems that a person is assumed innocent until proven guilty. As a 
result, there is a strong argument that evidence of criminality outside of 
convictions ought not to be relied upon in legal decisions, particularly 
those that result in significant infringements upon liberty and privacy. 
Nevertheless, risk instruments generally permit coding for criminal 
history measures without requiring convictions. Hence, the potential for 
weak, if not entirely inaccurate, information to guide risk assessment 
outcomes is real. Add to this vulnerability the prospect that the alleged 
prior offending may simply replicate discriminatory practices already 
existing in criminal investigation processes. The latter two concerns are 
further discussed below. 
1. Evidentiary Inadequacy 
As the coding for criminal history in actuarial tools often does 
not require a formal conviction, individuals may score positively for 
criminal acts that they did not commit. In the law, a simple arrest is 
insufficient proof that the arrestee actually committed the criminal 
offense alleged.147 Arrests frequently “happen[] to the innocent as well 
as the guilty.”148 A question of reliable evidence also exists with respect 
to the completeness of records. Convictions typically are well-
documented and files kept relatively complete for long periods of time. 
Outside of conviction data, recordkeeping can be sketchy or the 
evidence too thin to reasonably score as criminal history events. Thus, 
counting anything other than convictions when the legal and practical 
consequences to the defendant may be significant renders risk 
instrument coding for criminal history variables as subjective, 
unreliable, and unjust.149 
The perception that information not rising to the level of 
 
 
147
  Michael Edmund O’Neill et al., Past as Prologue: Reconciling Recidivism and 
Culpability, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 267 (2004). 
 
148
  United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
 
149
  O’Neill, supra note 147. 
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requiring a conviction is an insufficient source of data concerning 
criminal history has been forthrightly recognized in sentencing law. As a 
general rule, “[f]actual matters considered as a basis for sentence must 
have ‘some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.’”150 
Also, to meet due process requirements, the sentencing procedure must 
afford a defendant the opportunity to deny, dispute inaccuracies, or 
explain the information considered in determining the appropriate 
sentence.151 
In terms of criminal history, federal courts in sentencing 
hearings require independent substantiation of allegations of past 
offenses, even if the evidence is founded upon official reports.152 
Consistent therewith, the United States Sentencing Commission early in 
its promulgation of guidelines in the mid-1980s determined that an arrest 
was insufficient to officially count as prior criminal history for purposes 
of penalty recommendations.153 An agency report issued at the time 
explained that “information on the circumstances underlying past arrests 
not leading to conviction is frequently not available, and even where it is 
available it might not be sufficient to withstand legal challenge.”154 A 
1991 report by the same federal sentencing agency marked the 
Commission’s continued belief that “there would appear to be serious 
constitutional obstacles to the use of an arrest record, by itself, to 
enhance a criminal history score.”155 The federal sentencing institution’s 
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  United States v. Matthews, 773 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. 
Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.1982)). 
 
151
  State v. Hardy, 489 A.2d 508, 512 (Me. 1985); United States v. Leonard, 455 F.2d 
949, 951 (9th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80, 83 
(1st Cir. 2009) (overturning a sentence when the assumption of prior criminal history, 
which convinced the court to issue a longer sentence for deterrence purposes, was not 
supported by any evidence); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496–97 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (“[S]entencing—a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused—the 
defendant has an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of information the sentencing 
judge may rely on, to argue about its reliability and the weight the information should 
be given, and to present any evidence in mitigation he may have.”). 
 
152
  See United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2009) (listing cases). 
 
153
  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3, at 4.9 (1978) (ordering that “a 
prior arrest record itself shall not be considered” in criminal history category 
determinations). 
 
154
  Criminal History Working Group Report, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N. 6 (1989), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/working-group-
reports/miscellaneous/121989_Criminal_History.pdf. 
 
155
  Criminal History Working Group Report: Category 0, Category VII, and Career 
Offender, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N at 8 (1991), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
research-and-publications/working-group-
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official position remains the same today.156 Additionally, courts have 
ruled that supplemental substantiation is required even if the prosecution 
has proof from government records that the sentencing defendant had 
been officially charged157 or indicted158 for prior offenses. 
Sentencing expert Michael Tonry thus asserts that the “[u]se of 
any criminal history factors at sentencing other than prior convictions 
raises prima facie ethical due process and equal protection problems. 
People’s liberty should not be incrementally taken away except under 
fair procedures and standards of proof.”159 For the same reason, the 
incorporation of criminal history factors via risk assessment results 
should be subject to similar evidentiary standards because it offers a 
backdoor to the entry of unreliable criminal history information into 
other justice decisions. 
2. Reflecting Investigatory Practices 
A complementary reason that official records should not always 
represent factual substitutes for criminal history in risk assessment 
practices concerns a history of profiling known criminal offenders. 
Researchers have noted that “[r]earrests are more reflective of police 
activities than of the offender’s actual criminal involvement. In other 
words, official records are an imprecise proxy for actual criminal 
activity.”160 Bernard Harcourt has similarly reflected upon an economic 
model of criminal law in which profiling based on past offending can 
elicit efficiencies in policing; law enforcement officials conducting stop 
and search routines are encouraged to focus attention on higher risk 
offenders—notably, identified by their past criminal history—to yield 
expectedly higher arrest rates.161  
Anecdotal stories signal institutional practices of police 
harassing known ex-offenders by making questionable arrests as a 
 
reports/miscellaneous/101991_Criminal_History.pdf. 
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  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3(a)(3) (2014). 
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  Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740 (1948); United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 
701 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 
158
  Juwa, 508 F.3d at 701 (“We therefore adhere to the prescription that at sentencing, 
an indictment or a charge within an indictment, standing alone and without independent 
substantiation, cannot be the basis upon which a criminal punishment is imposed. Some 
additional information, whether testimonial or documentary, is needed to provide 
evidentiary support for the charges and their underlying facts.”). 
 
159
  Tonry, supra note 2, at 173. 
 
160
  Zhang et al., supra note 68, at 184.  
 
161
  HARCOURT, supra note 49, at 165–67. 
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means of encouraging them to move permanently from the 
jurisdiction.162 Similarly, when crimes occur, it is a common 
investigatory tactic to “round up the usual suspects” for questioning by 
mining official databases with information on like offenders.163 As a 
consequence, counting events outside conviction as indicating prior 
history can result in a high rate of false positives (constituting type I 
errors in scientific parlance). The potential for erroneous predictions of 
recidivists should be a concerning phenomenon from a scientific 
perspective for evidence-based practice enthusiasts. 
Several researchers have focused on the profiling consequences 
for the group of offenders who are uniquely reviled and also presumed 
by the public to pose intolerably high risk of recidivism—sex offenders. 
Still, this evidence can be informative in other contexts. Investigators 
have noted that using arrest information for risk assessment purposes is 
particularly problematic for samples of known sex offenders as police 
are more likely to make arrests based on lesser evidence than typically 
required due to their presumption of the repeat sex offender.164 For 
instance, a study of police arrests found evidence that officers were far 
more likely to take official action when a particular suspect was believed 
to have a prior history of sex offenses.165 Overall, there is substantial 
evidence that criminal justice authorities introduce a distorted and 
unrepresentative picture of “officially” known sex offenders when using 
mere arrest data to indicate recidivism risk.166 Risk assessments reliant 
upon official data thereby “inherit the partial or distorted sample of 
offenders produced by criminal justice systems. Recidivism and risk 
assessment research cannot produce reliable information about those 
who commit sex offenses.”167 Instead, this research supports the idea 
that tallying allegations of past offending, particularly of nonadjudicated 
crimes, may not represent true criminal history and may instead replicate 
biased practices of victims, police, and prosecutors, and perhaps, indeed, 
of society in general. 
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C. Acquitted Conduct 
Just discussed was the problematic practice of counting crimes 
not fully adjudicated in light of potential evidentiary weakness. Perhaps 
even more disconcerting is that risk assessment instruments often 
integrate into criminal history measures offenses for which the 
defendant was officially acquitted after a trial on the merits.168 This 
practice is even more dubious in nature because the defendant’s charges 
were subject to formal adjudication and he was found not guilty. 
To be sure, an acquittal does not necessarily indicate factual 
innocence. Some facts supporting guilt may have been present. A not 
guilty verdict may simply have resulted for other reasons. The 
prosecutor may not have met the highest evidentiary burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence 
for constitutional reasons or rules of evidence, or jury nullification, to 
name a few. In such recognition, even in the formal proceeding of 
sentencing on a different offense, judges sometimes will consider the 
allegation of a prior crime for which the defendant was acquitted as long 
as there is proof at the lower threshold of a preponderance of the 
evidence.169 In contrast, risk tools generally will score acquitted conduct 
as a criminal event without dictating any evidentiary threshold at all and 
without requiring any additional confirmation of the allegations 
underlying the (failed) prosecution. The risk assessment system 
therefore is set up to bolster criminal history scores across the board. 
Rather than presume that an acquittal negates the allegation, the tools 
concretize them. Clearly, imbedded therein is an appetite to absorb false 
positives (which, again, in empirical terms represent Type I errors), 
evidently in an effort instead to minimize false negatives. 
D. Juvenile Records 
Many of the instruments score juvenile offenses on similar terms 
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  Andrew Harris et al., STATIC-99 Coding Rules: Revised – 2003, STATIC-99 18 
(2003) (expressly scoring acquittals and successful conviction appeals), 
http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/static-99-coding-rules_e.pdf. Many instruments render 
this result through the absence of instructions to exclude acquitted conduct or 
conviction reversals. Federal Pretrial, supra note 95, at 5; OFFICE OF PROB. & 
PRETRIAL SERVS., FEDERAL POST CONVICTION RISK ASSESSMENT: SCORING GUIDE §1.1-
1.7 (2011); QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 97, at 50–52. In few instances, though, an 
instrument expressly excludes acquittals. See N.S.W. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., 
supra note 118, at 13 (“If a conviction is appealed it should still be counted unless the 
current criminal history shows the appeal was successful.”). 
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as adult crimes.170 Indeed, a few instruments retain independently scored 
variables specifically to add points for juvenile deviance.171 The 
introduction of criminal history via risk assessment into decision-making 
is a virtual backdoor to the use of juvenile offense data as well. This 
practice would seem to contradict any state law or policy that seeks to 
shield juvenile records, to limit future consequences for childhood 
malfeasance, or foster rehabilitative efforts by limiting labeling effects. 
Moreover, there may be reason to believe the juvenile adjudication 
process offers even less assurance of factual credibility than adult 
convictions and can lead to disparities because of conflicting 
expungement practices. 
1. Juvenile Adjudications Versus Adult Convictions 
Some commentators contend that there is nothing inherently 
wrong with counting juvenile convictions in computing an adult’s 
criminal history score.172 Indeed, studies typically show that young age 
at the onset of criminal behavior is a positive predictor of future 
recidivism.173 One commentator argues that the practice provides certain 
benefits. Recognizing juvenile crimes beyond childhood may deter 
juvenile offenders from reoffending as adults because of the increase in 
the potential punishment and encourages counsel defending juveniles to 
be more diligent in their representation to counter the increased stakes 
later in the client’s potential criminal life.174 
However, other experts have alleged that critical discrepancies 
regarding the procedural necessities between juvenile and adult courts 
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1.7 (2011); N.S.W. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIVE SERVS., supra note 118, at 13–14; QUINSEY 
ET AL., supra note 97, at 239. 
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supra note 118, at 14; WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 142. 
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Nguyen, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 107, 124 (2008). 
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render juvenile adjudications less reliable.175 Children are provided no 
constitutional right to a jury trial,176 and “[j]uvenile courts often follow 
evidentiary and procedural rules less rigorously; proceedings are 
characterized by more frequent procedural errors and are less adversarial 
than criminal court proceedings.”177 Courts have disagreed whether 
juvenile adjudications are less fair or reliable despite not enjoying 
identical protections. Still, the general consensus from state and federal 
courts is that juvenile proceedings are substantially similar to adult 
adjudications in the most relevant aspects to qualify as criminal history 
events to increase punishment.178 Nonetheless, there is queasiness about 
placing importance on juvenile deviancy; significant legal consequences 
may follow. This is exemplified by the commonality of state policies 
that permit the expungement of juvenile records. 
2. Inconsistency Due to Variances in Expungement 
Practices 
The official erasure of a past criminal justice event can apply to 
adults, but it is more frequently applied in the case of children. The 
juvenile system, more so than the adult regime, is often designed to 
focus on rehabilitation as a primary philosophy, and children are 
commonly viewed as immature offenders with a greater chance of 
reformation. Thus, it seems appropriate to discuss the potential impact of 
the expunging or sealing of records on risk assessment practices within 
the juvenile context. 
Jurisdictions vary dramatically in their policies of expunging or 
sealing juvenile records. These include such issues as age of eligibility, 
type of qualifying offenses, and the required length of an offense-free 
period.179 Such differences can lead to disparities across jurisdictions in 
accounting for criminal history in risk assessment tools among otherwise 
similarly-situated defendants.180 On the other hand, risk tools generally 
do not call for excluding evidence of prior offenses from their rated 
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factors despite being officially sealed or expunged.181 Indeed, the federal 
Post-Conviction Risk Assessment user guide specifically instructs raters 
to be flexible in the data used to discover juvenile offenses, warning that 
drawing on “[c]ollateral contacts will be important, since juvenile 
records are often not available.”182 But this inclusion of prior record 
data, despite laws that otherwise seek to shield them, is an additional 
unfortunate consequence to risk tool practices. 
This section addressed concerns with how criminal history is 
objectified in risk assessment practices. Whereas criminal justice 
outcomes across a variety of realms already rely upon prior offending 
behavior, the recent incorporation of risk assessment ratings serves as a 
clandestine means for criminal history to cause a ratchet effect in terms 
of its potential exponential significance. The analysis also highlighted 
potential flaws with how risk tools recognize and itemize prior criminal 
events in terms of evidentiary lapses and the probability of increasing 
false positives. The next part reveals additional reasons to suggest that 
officials should reassess their risk assessment practices. Certain 
normative controversies with the evidence-based practices movement as 
related to its emphasis on criminal history are outlined, and empirically-
based concerns are also embedded therein. 
IV.  NORMATIVE ISSUES WITH HISTORY LEADING RISK ASSESSMENT 
Recent debates within practitioner and academic circles about 
the current state of risk factors in criminal justice often orient toward the 
issue of basing risk predictions in part on immutable characteristics. 
Commentators have contested or ceded to risk assessment tools to the 
extent they score on variables directly or indirectly involving 
demographic factors (e.g., race, gender, age, family background) or that 
otherwise entail characteristics over which an individual is perceived to 
maintain little control (e.g., mental disorder, neighborhood conditions, 
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social class).183 In addition, a few academics have taken aim at the 
potential deficiencies in reliability and validity measures of current risk 
assessment tools considering the significant fallout that decisions reliant 
upon them can have for individual defendants.184 Still, with few 
exceptions, others have not challenged the forthright repurposing of 
criminal history in risk assessment methodologies. Indeed, many 
presume that prior offending factors remain constitutionally 
justifiable.185 Two exceptions arise with prominent scientists conversant 
in risk assessment who ethically object because criminal record operates 
as a proxy for race.186 This section will briefly recount the potential 
implications on race and social disadvantage that both risk assessment 
and criminal history engender. Before then, this part takes up the 
gauntlet by identifying and exploring additional normative issues with 
the conflation of criminal history and future risk in risk-based practices 
which have received less recent attention by legal, policy, and scientific 
professions. The issues herein entail proportionality of penalties, the 
harbinger of punishing status, failing to adequately account for patterns 
of desistance, and the combination of criminal history and future risk for 
representing proxies for demographic characteristics. 
A. Proportionality 
Policies to increase sanctions for past criminal acts may violate 
proportionality norms.187 In sentencing, criminal history enhancements 
that substantially augment sentences can operate to destabilize 
normative messages on the relative severity of crimes. “What a 
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community chooses to punish and how severely tells us what (or whom) 
it values and how much.”188 If a defendant convicted of a minor offense 
receives a harsher sentence than one convicted of a heinous felony due 
only to a differential in criminal history category, the apparent 
imbalance may appear to the public paradoxical.189 Similarly, if two 
defendants convicted of the same offense draw dramatically divergent 
sentences, the system would seem to undermine the goals of general 
deterrence by sending mixed messages concerning the potential 
punishment for committing that offense. 
Sentence length and supervisory restraints in the American 
criminal justice system are already criticized as overly severe.190 The 
evidence-based movement, which in reality works to enhance those 
same negative attributes, can easily turn irrational. A strong cultural 
backlash to maintaining an overbearing criminal justice system may 
erupt that can also harm a country’s reputation. 
State punishment that disregards its rational limitations turns the 
state’s punishment power against itself because it violates the 
public norms embedded in the very criminal law it purports to 
enforce. Unjustified punishment for crime is itself a crime 
because unjustified state violence violates the criminal law’s 
norms against illegitimate violence as does any other form of 
violence.191 
America might well stand virtually alone in employing high 
recidivist premiums in its criminal justice system. Other common law 
countries either do not incorporate similar enhancements or strictly 
constrain them.192 
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B. Sanctioning Hypothetical Crime 
Critics of a risk-based criminal justice system, one in which 
predictions can dictate sanctions or restrictions, charge that such a 
system inherently results in punishing an individual for potential future 
behavior.193 That is, it might be considered to constitute a 
criminalization of the hypothetical crime (i.e., a precrime). And with risk 
technologies being developed on group-based data, and thus de-
individualized, the scheme has been described by a reporter in the 
Boston Globe as merely representing “mechanical crime prediction.”194 
The same reporter titled his article “You Will Commit a Crime in the 
Future” and analogized the practice of risk assessment to the science-
fiction world of the film Minority Report.195 The plot of the movie 
involves the detection of precognitions of crime and the prosecution and 
punishment of the individual for his thought crime even though he might 
not have then been consciously aware of his future plan.196 
Supporters of interventions based on future recidivism risk 
assessment, though, contend that it is not punishment per se that 
officials are pursuing, but merely an exercise of the state’s duty to 
protect the public by implementing preventive detention options.197 
Critiquing the use of risk assessment to sanction hypothetical future 
crime is appropriate as a general matter. Nonetheless, this discussion 
will be tuned more specifically to risk assessment as informed by 
criminal history. 
1. Preventive Detention 
Risk assessments are used in punitive determinations such as 
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whether to incarcerate, lengthen a sentence, deny parole, enhance 
restrictions, or require registration. Yet critics argue that it seems unfair 
to penalize a person just for the potential of future behavior.198 From a 
theoretical perspective, these future risk-based practices deny the 
specific deterrence ability of the immediate conviction, sentence, or 
programming. They tend to negate broader notions of free will as well. 
Humans are fundamentally unpredictable. There can be no certainty as 
to whether a person will or will not commit some speculative future act. 
A policy that permits aggravated discipline for a hypothetical, future 
offense is akin to an informal scheme of inchoate crimes. Imperfectly, 
such a policy disregards criminal law’s otherwise fundamental elements 
of proving a culpable mental state (mens rea) coupled with voluntary 
conduct (actus reus). The crime is merely hypothetical; the 
consequences to the individual, however, are very real. A commentator 
has observed: 
[D]ecisions to impose restrictive sanctions of one type or another 
on convicted offenders who have completed their sentence can 
result in wrongful “convictions” in a practical sense. It matters 
little to such offenders whether they are technically convicted of 
a new offence when subject to further incarceration or other 
punitive sanctions at the conclusion of the index sentence. In this 
situation they are still incarcerated or have their liberty curtailed 
in other ways. The same argument applies to those convicted of 
offenses who are denied parole on the basis of the judgments of 
parole boards that they pose an unacceptable risk to the 
community should they be released on parole.199 
In contrast, advocates for enhanced responses to potential future 
offenders prefer to use different wording in which they isolate the 
scheme from criminal law, along with procedural requirements attendant 
to criminal prosecution. Again, notice the use of a preventive detention 
regime substituting for punishment. A state judge, who is a strong 
defender of risk assessments, does not conceptualize the use of 
incapacitation for high-risk offenders as punishment for future crimes.200 
Instead, he supports preventive detention as capitalizing upon the 
existence of a past criminal offense. He also supports utilizing risk 
assessment results to manage those prisoners who pose an unacceptable 
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threat to the community if freed.201 Further, advocates of incapacitation 
in the form of preventive detention openly support the adoption of 
criminal history as a proxy for future dangerousness.202 
Despite engaging the guise of preventive detention, officials 
disregard other procedural and substantive mechanisms that ought to 
accompany such a regime. A critic of preventive detention policies 
helpfully points out additional requirements that should be implemented 
with such a scheme: 
First, if the justification for detention is dangerousness, then 
logically the government ought to be required periodically to 
prove the detainee’s continuing dangerousness. If the 
dangerousness disappears, so does the justification for detention. 
However, if the detention is characterized as deserved 
punishment for a past offense, there is little reason to revisit the 
justification for the detention . . . . Second, if a person is 
detained for society’s benefit rather than as deserved 
punishment, the conditions of detention should not be 
punitive . . . . Third, prevention-justified restraint should 
logically be limited to the minimum required to ensure the 
community’s safety . . . . Finally, consistent with the preventive 
detention principle of minimum restraint, a detainee should be 
entitled to treatment if it can reduce the length or intrusiveness 
of the restraint.203 
Further, preventive detention offers the regrettable potential for a 
slippery slope. Paul Robinson, a former commissioner with the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, has observed that “if incapacitation of the 
dangerous were the only distributive principle, there would be little 
reason to wait until an offense were committed to impose criminal 
liability and sanctions; it would be more effective to screen the general 
population and ‘convict’ those found dangerous and in need of 
incapacitation.”204 Preemptive programming could be enforced if the 
preventive detention scheme is purported to be based on a rehabilitation 
model. Although as Robinson further suggests, this might be a slippery 
slope: “Screening of the [general] population would determine those 
people likely to commit future offenses absent rehabilitative treatment, 
followed by the imposition of liability and sanctions to compel the 
 
 
201
  Id. 
 
202
  Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventive Detention, Character Evidence, and the New 
Criminal Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 723, 727 (2010). 
 
203
  Robinson, supra note 123, at 1446–47. 
 
204
  Id. at 1439–40. 
ISSUE 20:1 SPRING 2015 
118 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 20:1 
required treatment and thereby to avoid the anticipated crime.”205 The 
potential future of preventive models just outlined becomes too close to 
the irrational world encapsulated in the pre-crime criminal justice 
system embodied in the movie Minority Report. 
It should be noted that the guise of the preventive detention 
regime to justify incapacitating those viewed as high-risk for 
hypothetically offending violates evidence-based practices for an 
additional reason. As appropriately recognized, “at present there is no 
empirical data to [justify] ‘sacrific[ing] one offender’s liberty in the 
hope of increasing the future safety of others.”206 Preventive 
incapacitation, then, may become simply too subjective, value-laden, 
and preemptory. 
2. Group-Based Attributions 
Additional impediments arise whereby recidivism risk 
assessment tools were normed on the groups the researchers studied.207 
As a result, group-based data, fundamentally, cannot reliably provide 
information about the individual’s risk.208 The reason for the potential 
mismatch is what has been nicknamed the “group to individual” or 
“G2i” challenge.209 The “G” represents the discipline of science that 
studies a phenomenon at the group level; the “i” indicates that the law, 
conversely, seeks to use science to understand an individual.210 The 
misapplication in an attempt to connect the two, the G2i trajectory, is not 
entirely understood by legal practitioners. Therefore, law-oriented 
professionals often place too much emphasis on the risk tool results in 
judging the individual level of risk. Group-based data can provide 
inferences about the group(s) upon which it was derived, but cannot 
diagnose any specific individual.211 
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Another scientific reality regarding risk assessment 
methodologies is also typically not appreciated in the law. The risk 
prediction tools were based on research that itself was not designed with 
a future orientation. In other words, 
[v]irtually all research that presents a scheme to predict 
dangerous behavior (be it future offending, violence, substance 
use, or another undesirable outcome) is not technically 
predictive. Rather, . . . these are better thought of as “post-
diction” studies, in which offenders are retrospectively classified 
into groups based on measures of past behavior.212 
Another statistical impediment exists: the G2i challenge of 
exploiting actuarial risk results to arbitrate the individual defendant’s 
own risk position. 
The actuarial method compares similarities of an individual’s 
profile to the combined knowledge of the past events of a 
convicted group of . . . offenders. An individual may share some, 
but typically not all, of the characteristics of the original sample. 
Hence, applying the results of an actuarial scale to an individual 
can have the effect of reducing the predictive accuracy of the 
scale. This is known as the “statistical fallacy effect.”213 
A related complaint regarding the G2i challenge applies to 
criminal justice penalties based on risk: the person is not necessarily 
being sanctioned on his own merits. Penalizing a person via risk 
assessment derived from group data means that punishment becomes 
situated on shared group characteristics and thereby is too de-
individualized.214 The scheme is akin to punishing someone for what 
other, purportedly statistically-matched persons have done.215 
C. Punishing Status 
An alternative construction to framing the idea of sanctioning 
the hypothetical crime via the proxy of criminal history is to conceive of 
the issue as one of penalizing an individual for his status. Here, the 
criminalizing status is one presumed to be indicative of future 
dangerousness. A couple of overlapping frames can be explored in this 
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idea of exploiting incapacitating options based on perceived status. The 
status-oriented perspectives are that of a “criminal” or one based on his 
(assumed) deviant character. Each potential status is formed on the 
existence of past offending behavior, is presumed causative of future 
antisociality, and is deemed fixed in nature. 
1. Being a “Criminal” – A Status Offense? 
Two constitutional issues arise with criminalizing an individual 
for his status. The United States Supreme Court in the case of Robinson 
v. California held that it was constitutionally impermissible to impose 
criminal punishments based on mere status.216 Robinson had been 
convicted of a California statue that rendered it a criminal offense to “be 
addicted to the use of narcotics.”217 One of the Court’s aversions 
appeared to be the state’s concession that a person could be continuously 
guilty of a criminal offense that targeted one’s chronic status.218 The 
second potential impediment is the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which prohibits re-punishing an individual for the same 
offense. Despite recidivist premiums and risk-based correctional 
interventions triggered by criminal history, supporters simply reframe 
the argument. Thus, in defense of the decisions that remove recidivist 
premiums from double jeopardy territory, the status formulation has 
been described as follows: 
Statutes imposing enhanced punishment on recidivists do not 
create a substantive offense, nor do they enhance the punishment 
of one of the prior crimes used as a basis for treating the 
offender as a habitual offender. They merely create a status 
which is a vehicle used to enhance the criminal punishment that 
otherwise would be imposed for the specific crime the accused is 
now charged with committing.219 
Consequently, the role of the prior conviction in increasing a 
sentence is explained as merely additional, justifiable punishment for the 
current offense. Further exploiting the careful selection of words and 
their relevant connotations to justify imposing increased restrictions on 
those considered at high future risk—based largely on past behavior—is 
this rephrasing: “One can ‘restrain,’ ‘detain,’ or ‘incapacitate’ a 
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dangerous person, but one cannot logically ‘punish’ dangerousness.”220 
Still, others see through the pretense exercised to avoid 
constitutional issues. Critics contend that recidivist premiums inherently 
criminalize status in order to extend the state’s ability to punish, coerce, 
and dominate.221 It appears more reasonable to submit that: 
[I]t is not clear whether the courts’ refusal to apply status-crime 
jurisprudence to sentencing is judicially well-founded. This is 
particularly true where the issues of status used in sentencing 
extend far beyond the crime for which the defendant is 
ostensibly being sentenced. Certainly, the same rule of law-
based concerns that disfavor the outright criminalization of 
status—the inherent threat to legal generality and its ancillary 
norms and the concomitant ability of the state to use this 
mechanism to individuate its sovereign power -are just as 
operative where status is used in punishment. In fact, they may 
be more operative at the point where punishment is actually 
imposed. Again, in this context it is not simply that status is 
made relevant to punishment; with habitual offender laws status 
is completely decisive without any rational inquiry into the 
circumstances of the prior conviction. In other words, there 
seems to be no functional difference between giving the status of 
being a criminal enormous marginal relevance in sentencing, as 
is the case with habitual offender laws, and embracing more 
forthrightly that these statutes make it a crime to be a criminal.222 
Practices that amount to punishing the status of being a criminal, 
without admitting to making this status a crime, is even more troubling. 
The intentional blurring of the lines in traditional criminal law frees 
officials from the procedures normally attendant to a criminal 
prosecution.223 The apprehension cited in Robinson should be equally 
unsettling in this context – where the crime of being a criminal based on 
prior record would seem to constitute a continuous offense. 
The rhetoric of the political campaign to adopt recidivist 
premium laws supports the underlying desire to further censure one for 
his socially-constructed master status—being a criminal. The history of 
the movement shows that those targeted for recidivist premium laws 
“were always objectified as criminals. At best they were felons, repeat 
offenders. More often they were predators or ‘dirtbags.’ Never did they 
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have a human identity beyond their criminal record.”224 Moreover, in 
enhancing consequences for a criminal record, the government exalts its 
power and mastery, whereby 
the state essentially arrogates to itself the right to cast 
criminality, and with this, the parameters of its license to assert 
its most salient powers of coercion, as a matter of status. 
Criminality is keyed to the phenomenological condition of being 
a criminal type. In this scheme, particular acts or transactions are 
reduced from forming the essential basis of criminal liability and 
the boundary of criminal sanction to merely providing a 
mechanism for confirming such a condition.225 
2. A Character-Based Approach 
A similar conceptualization to consider is whether punishing a 
status based on criminal record represents a character-based attribution. 
American criminal justice in various ways has seemed to refocus from 
illegal actions to dangerous individuals.226 Further, as the orienting 
dogma of this article should attest, a person with a criminal record is 
presumed dangerous, one especially deserving contempt and fear. The 
criminal is conceived “in terms of degeneracy, avarice, malice, and 
lust.”227 He engenders in others “a more primal or organic repulsion, 
having to do with the dirtiness and degeneracy of the recidivist.”228 
Justice Stevens previously approved this type of character-based 
doctrine, opining that: 
[A] person who commits two offenses should . . . be punished 
more severely than one who commits only one, in part because 
the commission of multiple offenses provides important 
evidence that the character of the offender requires special 
punishment, and in part because the character of the offense is 
aggravated by the commission of multiple offenses.229 
A debate among retributivists exists on the legitimacy of this 
character-based approach. A prominent retribution theorist suggests that 
a second-time offender bears greater culpability by demonstrating a 
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“character trait” in repeatedly disregarding others’ rights.230 “This 
approach views a prior record as a factor used to assess the defendant’s 
character, presumably on the assumption that character has some 
relatively fixed quality that can be measured. The question, in short, is 
reduced to whether this defendant has an evil character, and how 
evil.”231 Others disagree on retributivist grounds. One author contends 
that a character-based approach would be a slippery slope: such an 
approach would likewise authorize evidence in addition to criminal 
history that could attest to character, a regime in which strict just desert 
philosophers would likely disapprove.232 
Then there is the point, consistent with double-jeopardy-type 
complaints previously discussed: “[A] character-based approach cannot 
explain why treating a prior record as an aggravating factor is not 
equivalent to punishing the defendant twice for the same bad 
character.”233 
D. Informal Statute of Limitations 
A concern that challenges the empirical legitimacy of evidence-
based practices involves temporality. Risk assessment technologies 
generally qualify a past criminal act no matter how dated. The practice 
undercuts scientific principles as recidivism studies consistently show 
that the predictive ability of a prior offense decays over time and that 
many offenders actually desist from further criminal activities. The 
typical failure to place any statute-of-limitations-type of time restriction 
on prior crimes also ignores the age-crime curve in which people often 
naturally age out of criminal law violations. Further, risk assessment 
tools that do not consider dynamic factors ignore rehabilitation 
successes that should realistically drive down individual recidivism risk. 
1. Decay 
Statistical analyses show that individuals who have committed 
crimes in the past are more likely, on average, to reoffend later on in 
time.234 Supporters of policies that do not appreciate any temporal 
limitation on criminal history measures also contend that “[i]t is unclear 
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why a conviction, merely because it is dated, ought to be excluded from 
the criminal history calculation, especially when the offender has had no 
pause in his criminal activity over time.”235 Still, while undoubtedly 
many instances of persistent recidivists exist, any presumption that the 
vast majority of offenders pose a constant and lifelong risk is not 
supported by empirical evidence. 
Correspondingly, studies show significant decay in the 
predictive ability of a prior criminal event. A past crime’s predictive 
salience fades over time.236 Thus, the record of a criminal event appears 
to provide mainly a short-term correlation to recidivism.237 Of even 
more import, the longer the person remains crime-free, the risk of 
criminal offending greatly decreases as time passes, though the degree 
obviously varies depending on the type of crime and history of the 
individual.238 This pattern of declining risk profiles applies even to 
categories of offenders that risk assessment tools often consider high-
risk, like sex offenders.239 In general, the empirical picture regarding 
patterns of recidivism indicates that most offenders who have remained 
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offense-free for any appreciable period will eventually become low 
risk.240 Indeed, with sufficient time elapsed, the non-recidivist’s risk of 
reoffending becomes roughly equivalent to the risk of those in the public 
who have never offended.241 
Overall, recidivism studies contradict the popular belief that a 
significant majority of criminals remain at high risk of recidivism and 
that the risk remains constant.242 All of this empirical knowledge 
strongly calls for recidivism premiums and risk assessment tools to 
curtail the use of criminal history from a temporal perspective. 
Regardless of the theoretical choice to justify reliance upon criminal 
history to prevent future dangerousness, there is no evidentiary basis to 
count all prior offenses or assume a fixed risk profile.243 A few reasons 
to distrust the constancy assumption are that an individual’s propensity 
to reoffend may vary. As examples, the potential reward of offending 
may vary by circumstances, the individual may experience fluctuating 
levels of self-control, and antisocial individuals may encounter 
variations in rational thought in weighing consequences and benefits.244 
In sum, a criminal past does not always portend a recidivist future. 
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2. Desistance 
A concept closely associated with the decaying risk level is the 
idea of desistance.245 The slight difference is that desistance is viewed as 
a process in which the recidivism rate continues to decrease over time to 
a point where a crime-free existence becomes a stable trait.246 Desistance 
is considered generally achieved when the recidivism rate declines to 
near zero.247 A Bureau of Justice Statistics study of prisoners released in 
30 states in 2005, perhaps the best embodiment of a nationally 
representative sample to date, found an overall pattern of desistence with 
risk of recidivism steadily declining over time after release.248 
Positively, the “general tendency for recidivism risk to decline over time 
is among the best replicated results in empirical criminology.”249 
Desistance studies can provide useful information to risk 
predictions. The available empirical research tends to negate the 
presumptions of chronic criminal behavioral patterns and uniform 
recidivism risk. Experts exploring the literature have formulated 
recommendations about the appropriate length of time that a prior 
criminal event can remain somewhat useful to risk predictions. For 
example, researchers reflected that: 
[W]e are skeptical that blanket decision rules based exclusively 
on whether someone has a criminal record will provide useful 
information for behavioral predictions. Instead, our analyses 
suggest that decision makers should place information about 
criminal records into a context that pays close attention to the 
recency of the criminal record as well as the existence of a 
criminal record. That is, if a person with a criminal record 
remains crime free for a period of about [seven] years, his or her 
risk of a new offense is similar to that of a person without any 
criminal record.250 
Interestingly, other investigators have concurred with the seven-
year tolling. Desistence research indicates that risk profiles at the seven-
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year mark of a crime-free life for known offenders are similar to those of 
persons without prior convictions.251 As further explained by a legal 
academic, the 
reasons why these outdated sentences [should] not [be] counted 
is rather simple: they do not capture the individual’s current 
threat matrix, and an individual’s desert for prior crimes has 
grown stale. Put in individual autonomy terms, the older 
sentences may not be indicative of the internal progress that the 
offender has made over time.252 
i. Age-Crime Curve 
Age is also highly relevant in decay and desistance models. For 
a variety of offenses, studies indicate consistent and distinct patterns in 
terms of aging. Young people are far more likely to commit most types 
of crimes and the risk usually declines thereafter.253 Still, the pattern is 
not entirely linear across the lifespan. The “age-crime curve” accurately 
assesses research findings: 
The work on age-crime curves shows that very large percentages 
of young people commit offenses; rates peak in the midteenage 
years for property offenses and the late teenage years for violent 
offenses followed by rapid declines. For most offenders, a 
process of natural desistance results in cessation of criminal 
activities in the late teens and early 20s.254 
Overall, “a common theme of life course criminology is the 
finding that a majority of one-time offenders do not go on to lead lives 
of crime but indeed age out of, or otherwise desist from, criminal 
activity.”255 For this reason, the United States Sentencing Commission 
has suggested that factoring criminal history along with age would 
improve the predictive validity for recidivism.256 
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Unfortunately, neither the federal Sentencing Commission nor 
many other criminal justice agencies have explicitly incorporated age-
crime curve data into recidivist premiums or into risk assessment 
tools.257 Several instruments increase risk rating to adjust for a youthful 
age.258 Few, though, control for the back-end to materially reduce risk 
scores as offenders approach or exceed middle-age.259 Institutional 
practices remain entrenched in reifying criminal history as a whole in 
recidivism predictions with a presumption that evidence of a criminal 
past retains value over a lifespan. Yet, the results are inconsistent with a 
true evidence-based culture and lead to the unnecessary incapacitation of 
many offenders who would otherwise have simply desisted as they aged. 
Paul Robinson uses the term “prior-record cloak” to signify the 
reliance upon criminal history as a proxy for future dangerousness and a 
weak substitute for evidence of actual risk.260 He criticizes the 
incongruous decisions that result: “The prior-record cloak leads us to 
ignore younger offenders’ future crimes when they are running wild, and 
to begin long-term imprisonment, often life imprisonment under ‘three 
strikes,’ just when the natural forces of aging would often rein in the 
offenders.”261 Instead, Professor Robinson suggests that a more “rational 
and cost-effective preventive detention system would more readily 
detain young offenders during their crime-prone years and release them 
for their crime-free older years.”262 
Policies that cumulate criminal history points over the 
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defendant’s lifetime without time restrictions present a further obstacle 
to the efficient use of resources. Obviously, older people have more time 
to compile offending behaviors.263 As a consequence, as they age, prior 
offenders can achieve a criminal history score that overstates their risk 
(by ignoring the age-crime curve) or misrepresents their antisocial past 
(by obscuring the frequency and/or timeframes of prior criminal life). 
For example, risk tools might rate at high risk both: (a) a young person 
who committed three felonies in a short time span; and (b) an older 
person who committed three felonies over decades, the last of which 
dated far in the past at the time of assessment. Evidence from the age-
time curve would suggest the actual risk profile would likely be 
disparate, but most risk tools would obscure that reality. 
Certainly, policies dependent upon cumulative criminal history 
that ignore the age-crime curve in terms of decay and desistence patterns 
are hobbled by additional consequences. “By their very nature, recidivist 
statutes often do not catch up with an offender until after she no longer 
is in her crime prime.”264 Further, “[c]onfining people after they would 
have desisted from crime is in any case inefficient; it also may be 
criminogenic and operate to extend criminal careers of people who 
would otherwise have desisted.”265 
3. Dynamic Factors 
Positive efforts at desistance should be affirmatively rewarded as 
studies show they reduce culpability and risk.266 
The unqualified use of adult criminal history, while reflective of 
individual choice and a physical identity that is constant over 
time, does not contemplate the possibility that the individual 
may change over time and that his or her threat to the public and 
moral desert may change as well. To subject the individual for 
the actions of the past, without the requisite meaningful 
connection to those incidents, would have the consequence of 
needlessly placing the offender in Zeno’s paradox and rendering 
his or her internal progress a more distant prospect.267 
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The third- and fourth-generation risk assessments, by definition, 
fittingly incorporate at least some dynamic measures that implicate 
rehabilitative successes. Regrettably, the first- and second-generation 
risk tools do not score rehabilitation progress and thus fail to adequately 
capture data that would otherwise provide relevant information 
indicative of declining risk levels. Risk outcomes that result from those 
tools may therefore be inaccurate in the direction of overestimating 
recidivism potential. Similarly, risk-based policies heavily engaged with 
criminal history as a proxy and that ignore dynamic factors will suffer 
the same weaknesses. 
E. Proxy to Demographic Factors 
Recidivism risk assessment often operates to systemically 
prejudice disadvantaged groups.268 It may be the case that members of 
the underclass, because of situational barriers to pro-social achievement, 
are statistically more likely to resort to crime. Recidivist premiums 
thereby may honestly, yet disproportionately, ensnare marginalized 
individuals as such policies are 
overwhelmingly concentrated on those people who exist at the 
intersection of economic deprivation and racial exclusion—the 
so-called “underclass.” For these ‘rejects of market society,’ 
arrest and criminal conviction are not only much more likely 
than for more socially secure groups, these experiences are facts 
of life. For many denizens of the underclass, criminality is a 
rational, relatively normal response to the social conditions in 
which these people are mired.269 
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criminality, habitual offender laws extend and formalize that condition, 
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On the other hand, the systemic disadvantage may not actually 
replicate actual criminal offending but may be a byproduct of 
inequitable policing patterns. Thus, risk assessments’ 
reliance on arrest records may also exacerbate sentencing 
disparities arising from economic, social and/or racial factors. 
For example, officers in affluent neighborhoods may be very 
reluctant to arrest someone for behavior that would readily cause 
an officer in the proverbial “high crime” neighborhood to make 
an arrest. A record of a prior arrest may, therefore, be as 
suggestive of a defendant’s demographics as his/her potential for 
recidivism or his/her past criminality.270 
More discretely, dependence upon criminal history factors in 
risk predictions perpetuates systemic disservice to racial and ethnic 
minority groups who are otherwise entitled to protected status under 
equal protection law.271 Recidivist premiums policies’ use of prior 
evidence of offending exacerbate historical experiences in police 
investigation, arrest, prosecution, and criminal sentencing.272 
Black men are arrested at younger ages and more often than 
white men for reasons that have as much to do with racially 
differentiated exercises of police discretion as with racial 
differences in offending behavior. Racial profiling by the police 
targets blacks and Hispanics and exposes them proportionately 
more often than whites to arrest. Police drug enforcement 
policies target substances that black drug dealers sell and places 
where they sell them, resulting in rates of arrests for drug 
offenses that have been four to six times higher for blacks than 
for whites since the mid-1980s.273 
When juvenile records are incorporated into criminal history 
measures, further racial disparities become unavoidable as minority boys 
are overrepresented at all stages of the juvenile adjudication 
processes.274 Critics contend that “[r]acial discrimination in arrest, 
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sentencing, or parole decisions, which is unambiguously prohibited on 
normative grounds, is also empirically wrong as a basis for decisions 
about active offenders.”275 
Bernard Harcourt is adamant about the existence of evidence 
substantiating that “risk has collapsed into prior criminal history, and 
prior criminal history has become a proxy for race.”276 Indeed, Harcourt 
outlines that the risk instruments used in the early twentieth century to 
guide parole decisions explicitly used race and nationality as rating 
factors.277 After the civil rights movement in the 1960s when criminal 
justice authorities became cognizant of the political sensitivity to race-
based decision-making, direct measures of race and ethnicity were 
removed.278 However, he points to two changes implemented to act as 
newer proxies for race in risk assessment tools: (1) a reduction in the 
number and variety of risk factors overall; and (2) an increased emphasis 
on criminal history.279 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Today, few would doubt that the U.S. criminal justice system is 
overpopulated, overburdened, and too costly. The adoption of evidence-
based practices by legislators, criminal justice officials, and correctional 
practitioners is a commendable way to ameliorate the problems with the 
criminal justice system. Scientific data and knowledge are appropriate 
sources to educate and improve justice policies and programs. The 
issues highlighted herein explicitly addressed the convergence between 
criminal history measures and future recidivism risk that has emerged 
from evidence-based practices. Certainly, my proposal is not to reject 
empirically informed methods in their entirety. Instead, my hope is to 
reveal, highlight, and question the multiple consequences that the past-
future orientation has created, and thereby initiate dialogues concerning 
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the issues raised. Actuarial risk assessment has unfortunately amplified 
the impact of criminal records, and, using questionable sources, can 
qualify as evidence of past offending. As illuminated by the Back to the 
Future theme, the potential reconstruction of an individual’s prior record 
often may have the unfortunate effect of altering an individual’s future. 
A main purpose of the neorehabilitation movement was to revive 
and update the professional knowledge of best practices to reduce 
recidivism while still protecting the public from high-risk criminals. Yet, 
the reification of criminal history as outlined herein may undermine both 
the proportionality of penalties resulting therefrom and the promises of 
scientific studies. For example, desistance patterns are insufficiently 
incorporated within risk assessment tools. This article also explored the 
theoretical potential to re-label—and thereby normatively challenge—
the perspective of the past dictating the future embodied in risk 
technologies in terms of sanctioning the hypothetical future crime or 
one’s criminal status or character. In the end, it is the case that one’s past 
is related to one’s present and future. Nonetheless, the notion of free will 
and insights from evidence-based studies signify that any presumption 
of the “once-a-criminal, always-a-criminal” mantra is unwarranted. 
 
